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Ethnic conflict is a contemporary issue plaguing many states as the
international system moves towards a "New World Order." However, despite the
importance of ethnic-based violence and nationalistic social revolutions, current
conflict theories do not adequately explain the fundamental dynamics of ethnic conflict
or provide clear prescriptive policy guidance. This thesis articulates a model that
describes and explains ethnic conflict. The fundamental purpose of this effort is
two-fold. First, it provides a method to objectively examine and describe the
fundamental of ethnic-based conflicts, social, and political revolutions. Second, the
paradigm provides decision makers with important prescriptions for foreign and
domestic policies vis-a-vis ethnic conflict. To accomplish this goal, the thesis is
divided into three main sections Section one outlines the Political Ethnicity model
This four part model provides a simple yet powerful theoretical tool for analyzing
ethnic conflict. Section two applies the model to three case studies. These illustrative
case studies demonstrate the explanatory effectiveness of the Political Ethnicity
paradigm in actual instances of ethnic conflict. Section three applies the conclusions
drawn to guide policy decisions at both the international and domestic level. This
systematic approach to ethnic conflict should provide policy makers in both the State
and Defense Departments with a useful and objective decision making tool. The
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Ethnic Conflict. The name alone conjures forth CNN provided visions of angry
camouflaged youths with guns, crying old women with dead children, streams of refugees
with no hope, United States Marines buried under tons of concrete, land mine-produced
multiple amputees, and illegal covert funding. Mass media satellite links and facsimile
machines provide twenty-four hour information from around our global city and focus our
attention on strife in regions that we previously ignored. The New World Disorder brings
with it quantum social changes, often accompanied by armed violence.
Despite recent media attention, ethnic conflict is not a new phenomenon. It has
plagued political, economic, and social, interaction since primeval ethnic consciousness
emerged hundreds, if not thousands, of years ago. The contemporary issue, however, is
politically mobilized, operationally organizing aspects of ethnicity. The hyper-
nationalistic and transnational aspects of these conflicts portend severe consequences in
several ethnically heterogeneous states.
In his book Revolutionary Change, Chalmers Johnson states that "Revolution is social
change." While revolutions may be social changes, they are more importantly political
changes. Political realities are, after all, a manifestation of the socioeconomic
environment. Many of today's political changes have taken on ethnic characteristics that
reflect a virtual explosion of intense nationalism.
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During the Twentieth Century, there have been at least three distinct periods of
nationalistic movements: Post World War I, Post World War n/Colonialism. Post Former
Soviet Union (see Figure 1). These nationalistic movements either created new states or
saw the independence of historically distinct states.
Gicil
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Figure 1. Nationalism
Unfortunately, many of these nationalistic movements did not create ethnically
homogeneous states. Instead, ethnically heterogeneous states experienced dynamic
tensions that often led to violent conflicts between competing communal groups. Using
code phrases like self-determination, freedom, independence, ethnic cleansing, and
homelands, the leaders of ethnic movements mobilized their constituents to galvanize
nationalism with political objectives. It is this operational aspect of ethnicity based on
primordial ties that is revolutionary and potentially explosive.
Ethnic groups are not necessarily political. While an ethnic group may have a sense
of a unique identity, it does not necessarily follow that there will be an associated violent
ethnic movement. Indeed, there may be no movement at all except assimilation into a
dominant ethnic group culture. Threatening government actions, however, tend to evoke
a negative reaction. The effort of governments to suppress forcibly ethnic unrest assists
ethnic and communal leaders in their efforts to transform subliminal ethnic identity into
an operational one. This political aspect of ethnicity is the basis of the political ethnicity
paradigm.
Political ethnicity theory is a hybrid of both conflict analysis and descriptive theories.
This synthetic blend provides a comprehensive picture and illustrates the vast range of
dynamic variables that ethnic conflicts revolve around. In summary, political ethnicity
theory explains ethnic conflict using a combination of the other theories with ethnicity as
a skeletal basis. The four components of political ethnicity theory (ethnic group
identification, sources of ethnic conflict, ethnic group goals, and government responses)
are a systematic approach to this contemporary issue. Each of the three case studies
illustrates the practical application of political ethnicity theory to contemporary ethnic
conflicts and leads to four primary conclusions.
First, the presence of transnational ethnic groups faced with repressive government
actions increases the level of ethnic conflict. In each of the case studies, the most violent
ethnic minority was one that was also transnational. This is not surprising since these
groups have an outside source of support to reinforce their actions against a harsh and
repressive regime.
Second, horizontally stratified societies exacerbate inherent societal inequities.
Although this tension increases violence when coupled with other sources of ethnic
xi
conflict, it is not a primary cause of ethnic-based turmoil nor does it alone provoke
violence.
Third, government strategies towards ethnic groups do make a difference. As the
case studies effectively illustrate, violent ethnic conflict is mostly associated with
strategies of containment. As governments attempt to repress ethnic group demands for
political, social, and economic power, ethnic identity is reified. Ethnic group and
communal leaders are then able to translate this primordial ethnic identity into an
effective operational ethnic identity in opposition to the government. While it is certainly
true that strong central governments can effectively restrain ethnic conflict with
overwhelming application of force, this strategy of containment is a short term solution
that eventually leads to increased violence.
Strategies of accommodation, on the other hand, allow for political, social, and
economic freedom of minority ethnic groups. These expressions tend to be peaceful and
less threatening to a central government as political, social, and economic power is shared
between competing ethnic groups. Thus, the basis of ethnic conflict is transmuted and
diffused, eliminating the support base of ethnic and communal leaders. The overall result
is that with the loss of their ethnic constituency and raison d'ete for ethnic-based strife,
the inherent tensions of society are reduced to a manageable level of conflict. Therefore,
strategies of accommodation are long term solutions to ethnic conflict since they
significantly reduce the level of violence.
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Although there are many other examples of terminated or ongoing ethnic conflicts.
Azerbaijan, Lebanon, and Nicaragua are excellent illustrative case studies that support the
three conclusions above. These three examples demonstrate a blend of ethnic conflict
factors with differing results. These results are summarized in the table below and




















Azerbaijan Language Yes C- A-C Mixed
Vertical
No
Lebanon Religion Yes A-C Mixed
Vertical
No
Nicaragua Genetics No A- C - A Horizontal Yes
Fourth, with the end of the Cold War, violent conflicts in general have become
increasingly more regional in nature. Despite the horrible atrocities associated with ethnic
conflicts, they do not always require intervention from states outside the affected region.
Indeed, foreign involvement tends to increase the level of violence rather than mitigate
or end it. As with any civil war, ethnic conflicts stop when one of three events occur:
one belligerent party wins, all belligerent parties become too exhausted to continue, or
there is a negotiated settlement equally unfavorable for all. Unfortunately, external
interference prolongs ethnic conflict and prevents one of these three conditions from being
xm
met. To put it simply, ethnic conflicts eventually "burn themselves out" if competine
groups are left alone.
xiv
I. INTRODUCTION
Ethnic Conflict. The name alone conjures forth CNN provided visions of angry
camouflaged youths with guns, crying old women with dead children, streams of refugees
with no hope, United States Marines buried under tons of concrete, land mine-produced
multiple amputees, and illegal covert funding. Mass media satellite links and facsimile
machines provide twenty-four hour information from around our global city ] and focus
our attention on strife in regions that we previously ignored The New World Disorder
brings with it quantum social changes, often accompanied by armed violence. 2
Despite recent media attention, ethnic conflict is not a new phenomenon. It has
plagued political, economic, and social, interaction since primeval ethnic consciousness
emerged hundreds, if not thousands, of years ago. The contemporary issue, however, is
the politically mobilized, operationally organizing aspects of ethnicity. What is most
important, the hyper-nationalistic and transnational aspects of these conflicts portend
severe consequences in several ethnically heterogeneous states.
In his book Revolutionary Change, Chalmers Johnson states that "Revolution is social
change."'
1 While revolutions may be social changes, they are more importantly political
changes. Political realities are, after all, a manifestation of the socioeconomic
environment. Many of today's political changes have taken on ethnic characteristics that
reflect a virtual explosion of intense nationalism.
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During the Twentieth Century, there have been at least three distinct periods of
nationalistic movements: Post World War I, Post World War II/Colonialism, Post Former
Soviet Union (see Figure 2). These nationalistic movements either created new states or







IMO 1911 1945 19S0 1190
Figure 2. Nationalism
Unfortunately, many of these nationalistic movements did not create ethnically
homogeneous states. Instead, ethnically heterogeneous states experienced dynamic
tensions that often led to violent conflicts between competing communal groups. Using
code phrases like self-determination, freedom, independence, ethnic cleansing, and
homelands, the leaders of ethnic movements mobilized their constituents to galvanize
nationalism with political objectives. It is this operational aspect of ethnicity based on
primordial ties that is revolutionary and potentially explosive.
A. OBJECTIVES
This thesis has two fundamental objectives. First, I explore the dynamics of ethnic
conflict. This exploration attempts to discover how the primordial aspects of ethnicity are
translated into an operational and political reality. Further, I examine the transformation
of ethnic group political objectives into conflict with other ethnic groups and the
government Finally, I outline government strategies of conflict resolution and the effects
these strategies have on politically mobilized ethnic groups. This analytical framework,
or political ethnicity paradigm, is a systematic approach to understanding the dynamics
of ethnic conflict as a contemporary issue.
Second, I examine the policy implications associated with ethnic conflict These
policy implications are at both the international and state level of analysis. As a
contemporary issue facing decision makers, ethnic conflict demands resolution. It does
little good to provide an analytical paradigm if that model does not assist the decision
making process. This thesis attempts to provide some possible directions for policies
concerning ethnic conflict not only at the state level but also at the international level.
B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
My thesis is the result of an examination of current conflict theories and sociological
studies of ethnicity. It quickly became apparent that conflict theories with their
predominantly single variable approach could not adequately explain the complex
dimensions of ethnic conflict. Similarly, sociology, in particular cultural anthropology,
only provided a description of ethnicity and human motivation factors. Obviously, to
understand ethnic conflicts more fully required a multi-discipline, multi-variable approach
The political ethnicity paradigm is a multi-variable reduction and synthesis of these
various disciplines into a single integrated analytical framework As with any model.
there are some variables that are either ignored or controlled. In the case of political
ethnicity, I concentrated on the factors and processes that transformed primordial ethnic
identity into operational and potentially conflictive situations. The four part political
ethnicity paradigm yielded several hypotheses. However, again for simplicity of analysis,
only three are examined within this thesis. Further, the political ethnicity paradigm is
then blended into crisis management theory to extract policy implications at both the state
and international level of analysis.
To test the three hypotheses, I conducted a controlled comparative analysis using
three case studies. The case studies were selected based on several different criteria.
First, different geographical areas avoided the problem of regional specificity. Second,
the case studies represent not only discrete primary ethnic identification factors but also
various and dissimilar patterns of government responses to ethnic conflict Finally, I
chose case studies that did and did not include transnational ethnic groups to determine
the impact that variable had on ethnic conflicts.
C. ORGANIZATION
This paper focuses on ethnic conflict in three steps. Chapter II discusses political
ethnicity and establishes the analytical framework for case study analysis. In Chapters
III, IV, and V I apply the political ethnicity model to three case studies to determine how
well the paradigm phenomenologically explains ethnic conflict Chapter VI is an
exploration into how political ethnicity can be blended with crisis management theory and
the implications for ethnic conflict. Finally, in Chapter VII, a comparison of the three
illustrative states combined with deterrence, compellence and crisis management theory
not only proves the utility of political ethnicity theory but also suggests some important
conclusions about government policies
II. POLITICAL ETHNICITY THEORY
Any analysis of how governments respond to ethnic conflict must be divided into at
least two levels: the international system and state level. There are, however, several
immediate difficulties with using current prevalent crisis management, conflict, and level
of analysis theories.
6 The political ethnicity theory attempts to correct the difficulties of
other analytical methods described below.
First, ethnic groups are non-state actors. Although at times they are organized,
control territory, and display some common traits of a state, ethnic groups are seldom
recognized by the international community as having state status 7 Second, political
economy and political development theories emphasize a single variable as the primary
source of conflict. This emphasis not only discounts other factors but significantly
restricts analytical efforts. Third, cultural anthropology provides descriptive analysis of
distinct groups of people but does not address conflict.
Political ethnicity theory is a hybrid of both conflict analysis and descriptive theories
This synthetic blend provides a comprehensive picture and illustrates the vast range of
dynamic variables that ethnic conflicts revolve around. In sum, political ethnicity theory
explains ethnic conflict using a combination of the other theories with ethnicity as a
skeletal basis. The following discussion outlines the four components of political
ethnicity theory: ethnic group identification, sources of ethnic conflict, ethnic group goals,
and government responses. Each of the three case studies illustrates the practical
application of political ethnicity theory to contemporary ethnic conflicts.
A. DEFINING ETHNIC GROUPS
Any discussion of ethnic groups must begin with a definition of what comprises
ethnicity. The components of ethnicity can be divided between major and minor
determinants. The combination of the various determinate variables, major and minor, is
the calculus that differentiates ethnic groups. This approach to ethnic group definition is
a blend of social and natural science.
Ethnicity Components
Major Determinants Language, Religion, Genetics
Minor Determinants Geography, Culture, History, Economy
Major determinants can stand alone. These ethnic variables are explicit enough that
they can, on a macro level, define and delineate one ethnic group from others. Minor
determinants do not stand alone. These determinants cannot define an ethnic group by
themselves. However, minor determinants add depth, reinforce, and enhance ethnic group
definitions and differentials based on the major determinants.
1. Major Determinants
There are three major determinant factors in ethnic group definition: language,
religion, and genetics. Language is perhaps the most important determinant of ethnic
group identity.
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If nothing else, language decides the basic framework in which people
describe and view their natural environment lu It becomes the filter of interpretation and
affinity with other human beings It is the cognitive elements of thought, emotion, and
expression that attenuate perceptions of the physical environment Moreover, people feel
a natural affinity and identification with others who speak a common language. Common
language allows them to communicate freely and establish a cognitive bond As a
cognitive bond, language is the medium people use to express shared beliefs, attitudes,
norms, values, and knowledge.
Religion is another important determinant in ethnic affiliation. It is the spiritual
and moral influence in an ethnic group's identity based on their perceived relationship
with a supernatural entity. Religious norms shape the way individuals within ethnic
groups interact with other members of society. In some religions, spiritual laws permeate
all aspects of an ethnic group's distinctiveness. Although religious standards are often
codified, they are normally used to describe acceptable social behavior. Finally, religion
can influence education within an ethnic group. New ideas that conflict with existing
religious tenants are considered sacrilegious and rejected.
The last major determinant in ethnic classification is genetics. 11 Skin color, body
type, and facial features are the most visible symbols of ethnic group affiliation. The
classification of ethnic groups based on distinctive genetics ranges from biological to legal
definitions. In a micro-analysis, genetics is only a somatic birth right definition In a
macro-analysis, genetics forms the basis for many formal, legal descriptions of ethnic
groups. Like language, common genetic features tend to promote affinity within an ethnic
group
2. Minor Determinants
There are four minor determinant elements: geography, culture, history, and
economy. Geography contributes to ethnic group affiliation when it promotes a sense of
isolation from other groups. Groups that are physically separated from other human
beings take on unique characteristics and patterns of behavior. They view other people
from beyond their physical boundaries as outsiders who do not share the same values.
Isolation alienates ethnic groups from other people and intensifies local customs without
infusion of new ideas.
Culture is usually incorrectly expressed as the religion and language of an ethnic
group Although similar to these major determinants, culture is the outward manifestation
of the combination of an ethnic group's attitudes, beliefs, norms, values, aesthetics and
lifestyles.
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Ethnic groups maintain and emphasize cultural traditions to promote
uniqueness. This emphasis helps one ethnic group to maintain an individual identity that
is different from other ethnic groups that share common determinants.
Another minor ethnic determinant is history. Like culture, the written and oral
history of an ethnic group provides them with a feeling of uniqueness. Their collective
experiences as a group divides them from other people who otherwise share many similar
ethnic determinants. This natural affiliation is greatly enhanced when history is skewed
to emphasize the importance of a particular ethnic group
Finally, economic patterns stratify societies into functional ethnic groups. 1. In
communities where the division of labor is linked to social class, ethnic group
stratification is even more important. Peasants are viewed differently than factory
workers, professionals are divided from bureaucrats Functionally segregated societies
founded on traditional and legal distinctions are explosive Class distinction is an extreme
form of economic-based ethnic group identification.
The combination of the major and minor determinants, however, is not the final
resolution that defines ethnicity. People belong to one ethnic group or another by merely
believing that they do. In many respects, therefore, ethnicity is self-defining.
B. SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
All heterogeneous societies and states experience a constant dynamic tension between
competing ethnic groups. The primordial source of this ethnic conflict is the struggle for
power. The quintessential and purest aspiration of ethnic conflict is redistribution of
power within a society. Although there are many different ways this societal friction
manifests itself, peacefully or violently, the basic impetus of an ethnic group in conflict
is to maintain or increase their relative power. In a socioeconomic sense, ethnic groups
compete for scarce resources. In a political sense, they compete for authority.
14
Ethnic groups in conflict direct their competitive struggle toward two distinct
opponents: the government and other ethnic groups. Although the root cause of the
confrontation with the prevailing government or other ethnic groups is still based on
power, the two categories of conflict can be further refined. These subdivisions are not
10
mutually exclusive and all ethnic strife involves multiple, reinforcing reasons for conflict
However, for simplicity and clarity, I will address each separately






1. Conflicts with the Government
Ethnic group conflicts with the government have two ingredients: ethnic
preference and inadequate institutions to handle social/political mobilization. Many states
have public policies or laws that favor one ethnic group over another. The most invidious
evidence of preferential treatment is government sponsored ethnic discrimination in the
areas of public service, education, political parties, housing, and jobs.
|S
The "politics of
dominance" 10 alienates and disenfranchises disadvantaged ethnic groups by denying them
equal or fair access to economic resources and political institutions. Rebellion, revolt, or
social revolution is the natural result.
Ethnic groups are not inherently political.
17
But, strong ethnic leaders can
mobilize ethnic groups when governments fail to meet "minimum expectations"
1
Mobilized ethnic groups place a tremendous strain on the structures of government,
especially in societies with unresponsive or underdeveloped institutions.
19 The net result
is the same frustration found in societies with preferential policies. Directed political
11
activism provides an outlet for these frustrations If demands are not met, there is
potential for political instability and social revolution Thus, without sufficient
institutional recourse to diffuse socioeconomic and political frustrations, mobilized ethnic
groups are inevitably propelled into conflict with the government.
2. Conflicts with Other Ethnic Groups
Class becomes an issue in stratified societies when mobility opportunities are
limited or restricted by ethnic identity. Incipient antagonism results when the lower class
believes that the upper class is responsible for this suppression of upward mobility
opportunities. The natural objects of their resentment, anger, and hostility are any or all
of the higher class ethnic groups. Violence and belligerence occur when there are no
legitimate outlets for the underprivileged and disadvantaged ethnic groups' fury.
While the confrontation rhetoric of ethnic group leaders normally speaks of
specific inequalities in socioeconomic and power distribution, the subliminal message is
usually, if not always, a comparison of human net worth. Ethnic chauvinism and racism
are simply different degrees of promoting the predominance of one ethnic group based
solely on its ethnicity. This is the most insidious and dangerous element of ethnic
conflict People are capable of tremendous atrocities when they believe that the object
of their violence is subhuman or innately inferior. This moral disengagement is common
when ethnic groups resort to terrorism to achieve their socioeconomic and political
goals 20
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Finally, ethnic groups do not voluntarily disappear. One of the most powerful
human emotions is survival. The fear of extinction is a powerful motivation for ethnic
groups to maintain their ethnicity. They will forcibly resist assimilation by other ethnic
groups even when resistance is prejudicial to upward mobility or advancement Although
individuals may temporarily submerge their ethnicity to gain an advantage in a stratified
society, they never divorce themselves completely from their ethnic affiliation :i This
affiliation remains submerged just below the surface and can quickly emerge when
affronted by a different ethnic group.
C. DEFINING ETHNIC GROUP GOALS
Ethnic movements as social revolutions translate the elements of conflict described
above into specific goals. As also discussed earlier, these goals are inherently attempts
to gain political, social, and concomitant economic power. The leaders of nationalistic
power struggles appeal to ethnic group identity to achieve a consensus and promote their
ideologies. This dynamic shift from primordial to operational ethnicity, directed by ethnic
group and communal leaders, is essential to understanding political ethnicity. These
movements can be divided into three basic types: separatism, integration, and
ethnocratism. Each class of movement is subdivided based on the political goals of the
participants." This typology is important to distinguish between purposeful change and
what is otherwise unidirectional, undisciplined, and ubiquitous hyper-nationalism.
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Typology of Ethnic Movements
1 Type Political Goal Examples








Ethnocratist Equality Lebanon, S. Africa
Dominance Uganda, Rwanda
1. Separatist
Separatist movements involve a consolidation of political power in a region
defined by a homogeneous or dominant ethnic group. These movements are subdivided
based on two distinct political goals. Autonomist desire a region within an existing state
that allows them political determinism. Conversely, secessionist desire to establish a
completely new and distinct political entity or nation-state.
2. Integrationist
Integration movements are also subdivided into two political goals Irredentist
aims are redefinition of political boundaries based on ethnic identity. This involves
consolidating an ethnic group that has been separated artificially by state boundaries
Often, these boundaries were arbitrary decisions of colonial powers or other imperialistic
14
actions. Congregation, on the other hand, results from the diaspora of an ethnic group
Simply stated, it is the "search for a homeland " Several ethnic groups have been forcibly
uprooted from their traditional geographical locations and disbursed around the world
While retaining an ethnic identity, their political goal is to establish a homeland where
all of the refugees can consolidate and form a homogeneous society This can be within
the geographical boundaries of an existing state or by creation of a new one
3. Ethnocratist
As described earlier, many societies have laws and political systems that grant
special status to certain ethnic groups at the expense of others Ethnocratic movements
involve renegotiation of these existing preferential policies. Desired political changes can
follow one of two paths Some movements merely want political equality for their ethnic
group Other, more radical movements, attempt to displace the authority of the ruling
ethnic group and replace the government with one dominated by their own ethnic group
D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES
Ethnic conflict is both political and social revolution. Ethnic groups engaged in
revolution invoke many governmental responses. Although the essence of government
action is always power diffusion, specific strategies fall into two broad categories
strategies ofaccommodation and strategies ofcontainment Similarly, Huntington divides
governments into two categories, civic and praetorian."
3 While he argues that specific
polices or strategies of power diffusion are dependent variables based on the relative
15
degree of institutionalization in the affected society, the essential division is between
accommodation and containment of political and social mobilization.
1. Strategies of Accommodation
Democratic regimes and governments generally respond to ethnic conflict with
strategies ofaccommodation. The general goal of these strategies is to peacefully resolve
ethnic conflict before it escalates to violence. These strategies involve bargaining,
compromise and consensus as the central government attempts to deter armed violence
by an ethnic group through conciliation and negotiated settlements rather than the threat
of violence. However, since the ethnic group is nearly always the weaker party, there is
still an implied threat. Nonetheless, this strategy is particularly effective at diffusing
violent ethnic conflict since it concedes to the political (and often socio-economic) goals
of the rebelling ethnic groups. Thus, the state under siege by an ethnic uprising defends
itself through artful negotiations.
2. Strategies of Containment
Unlike democratic or. civic political systems, autocratic, totalitarian, or praetorian
regimes and governments more often invoke strategies of containment . These strategies
always involve a strong element of coercive compellence as the state actions attempts
behavior modification. Ethnic groups are coerced into acceptable actions through
punishment. This is brutal power in raw form. However, as stated earlier, the survival
instinct is extremely powerful and the net effect of excessive suppression is a prolongation















Although political ethnicity theory generates several possible hypotheses, only three
are used for a discussion within the international context. First, government strategies of
containment are the primary causes of violent ethnic conflict The genesis for this
hypothesis rests with the issue of survival. Government strategies of containment threaten
ethnic groups in the most basic sense. It is logical, therefore, that ethnic and communal
groups faced with repressive government policies that they perceive to be life threatening
will respond violently.
Second, the presence of transnational ethnic groups increases the level of armed
violence Transnational ethnic groups enjoy an escape valve that single state ethnic
groups do not - automatic external support. As transnational groups, some communal
groups can appeal to outside sources of support for their struggle against a government
This immediately escalates the scope of a conflict and the intensity of the ethnic conflict
Third, horizontally stratified ethnic societies are more prone to violent ethnic conflict
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Stratified societies that reinforce the ethnic differences through the distribution of
political, social, and economic power are much less likely to peacefully resolve their
conflicts This conflict factor is additive to others and increases the level of violence
F. CONCLUSIONS
The political ethnicity paradigm is an extremely useful analytical tool to examine
ethnic conflict. By systematically reducing ethnic conflict to its vital components, an
analyst or decision maker can methodically determine root causes and subsequent viable
policy options. Although it does not include every variable possible, political ethnicity
overcomes the limitations of single variable analysis inherent in prevalent conflict
theories. Moreover, it also demonstrates utility as a descriptive approach to classification
of ethnic groups within states.
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III. CASE STUDY: AZERBAIJAN
Nagorno-Karabakh The Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh rivets world
attention to the ethnic problems within Azerbaijan Armed violence and the Armenian
invasion of Azerbaijan painfully illustrates the extent of ethnic hatred and destructive
competition this former Soviet state currently suffers with. However, the former Russian
rulers not only established some of the root causes of this conflict but also are the
solution.
A. ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION
There are three genuses of peoples that inhabit the modern political state of
Azerbaijan: Altaic, Caucasian, and Indo-European (See TABLE I). 24 Within these three
general designations, seven primary nations live in the state of Azerbaijan. 2 ' The most
numerous and widespread nation is the Azerbaijani. The Russian and Armenians are the
next largest groups followed by several smaller, though distinguishable, nations. An




The importance of language to ethnic identification cannot be overstated.
26
The single distinct factor of ethnicity that differentiates the nations of Azerbaijan is their
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native spoken tongue (see TABLE 2). The Azerbaijani and Russian language to nation
correlation is the highest at nearly one hundred percent ~ 7 A lower but still significant
correlation of the Armenians is partially attributable to their common knowledge of
Russian. This bilingual condition represents the long and close ties between the
Armenians and the Russians. At the other end of the spectrum, the Tsakhur and Talysh
nations are undergoing a rapid assimilation process. The loss of their spoken language
substantially accelerates this incorporation into the Azerbaijani nation. 28
The written script of language is equally consequential. Only the Russians and
Armenians have retained their original written scripts (see TABLE 4). :9 Again, this
emphasizes the special status that these two nations have historically enjoyed within
Azerbaijan.
b. Religion
Azerbaijan rests squarely at the decisive point that historically divides the
Christian from the Islamic world. Similarly, religious affiliations are closely related to
ethnic identification in Azerbaijan. This factor divides the state into Christians and
Muslims (see TABLE 3). Most of the population is Shi'ite with a substantial Sunni
minority. On the other hand, The Russians and Armenians are Eastern Orthodox These
religious differences further reinforce the language cleavages.
2. Minor Determinants
The minor determinants of geography, culture, history, and economy contribute
to the division of Azerbaijani society. First, there are three peripheral mountainous
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regions. Each has an associated resident ethnic group. The Dagestanis are in the north,
the Iranians are in the southeast; the Armenians are in the infamous western Nagorno-
Karabakh. ° This does not imply that these nations are geographically restricted It
merely means that the mountainous regions not only have the heaviest concentration of
these groups but also provide them with a sense of isolation and separateness.
Also significant is the mountainous Autonomous Region of Nakhichevan
Although physically separated from the remainder of Azerbaijan, the central Azerbaijani
government maintains administrative control over Nakhichevan. This unique situation was
arrived at based on the large Azerbaijani population in the region and stands in sharp
contrast to the parallel condition in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Conversely, the major Russian concentrations surround the capitol city, Baku (see
TABLE 5). This proximity to the capitol grants the Russians greater access to the seat
of power Moreover, it makes the Russian presence much more noticeable than if they
were confined to distant mountain districts.
Second, each of the three primary nations fiercely guards their cultural heritage
Again, it is difficult to separate the Christian and Islam cultures from their religious
affiliations. Simply, the two ethnic elements reinforce and mutually support each other
Similarly, history accentuates the religious cleavages. The Christian and Muslim histories
differ greatly for the area in historical interpretation of events/
11
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B. SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 32
1. Historical Perspective
To understand the roots of ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan, we must turn to the
historical development and experience of the region/' Without a proper appreciation for
this context, the current ethnic strife seems mysterious and imponderable. M History has
not been kind to the Transcaucus area. Conquest and domination have strongly
influenced intergroup relations as competing Christian and Muslim forces fought to
control Azerbaijan's oil resources. 35 In succession, the Armenian, Ottoman, Tsarist
Russian, and Soviet Empires have conquered and colonized the people of Azerbaijan. 3b
Each successive wave left a lasting political, economic, and social mark on the modern
state.
The legacy of the politics of domination is a loosely horizontally stratified
Azerbaijan state and society. 37 Years of colonial and Soviet rule resulted in the Russian
and Armenians minorities occupying many of the upper positions of society (see TABLE
13-14). 38 While the Russian authority was acquiesced to, the Armenians were widely
resented. The Azerbaijanis viewed the Armenians as opportunist and surrogates for the
Russians. 39 As a member of the USSR, the Azerbaijani majority had to accept this
condition. With independence, however, the newly empowered Azerbaijani political
leaders seized the opportunity to correct perceived wrongs.
22
2. Political
Until Azerbaijan gained independence from Moscow in 1991, the state was
subjected to federal colonization along with the other non-Russian republics'" Ethnic
Russians dominated, subjugated, and ruled Azerbaijan following the Tsarist colonial
precedence.
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Although, the Soviet administers have departed, one of their political
legacies in Azerbaijan is pro-Russian patronage. 4: This extensive patronage system
insures that Russian ethnic groups and their Azerbaijani supporters will continue to
receive preferential treatment at the expense of other groups.
Another source of conflict is the controversy over the political status of Nagorno-
Karabakh. Today, the political and ethnic leaders of this predominately Armenian area
feel politically impotent against the Azerbaijani majority. The withdrawal of Nagorno-
Karabakh's autonomous status in 1991 while Nakhichevan remains semi-independent
compounds this frustration. Further, the sudden withdraw of the Armenian's Soviet support
base amplifies a general feeling of disenfrancisement.
3. Economic
The most powerful economic institution in Azerbaijan is the oil industry. 43
Historically, Azerbaijani nationals owned the oil companies, Russians and Armenians ran
them, and Azerbaijani workers along with minority immigrants provided raw labor (see
Table 13-14) This ethnic stratification crystallized societal friction between the skilled
(Russian and Armenian) and unskilled (Azerbaijani and "Persian") workers.
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Despite the
frictions, during the prosperous economic years, this arrangement benefitted everyone
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However, oil production and related industries have been on a sharp downward trend for
the past ten years with a corresponding negative effect on the Azerbaijani economy (see
TABLE 9-1 1 )/
4S
Although in Baku the Azerbaijani were wealthy industrialists and merchants,
most were subsistence peasants in the countryside.
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This contrasted sharply with the
affluent Russians and Armenians who principally occupied Baku and other major cities. 47
Russian and Armenian concentrations in the cities put these two ethnic groups in direct
competition with upwardly mobile and ambitious Azerbaijani petty bourgeoisie. The
ensuing friction has routinely and often turned explosive. The 1988 Sumgait and Baku
pogroms were merely the most recent manifestation of this hostility Still, the pattern of
domination by Russian and Armenian of middle class positions suggests that there is less
economic opportunities for the majority Azerbaijani nation
Despite the abundance of the Russians and Armenians in urban areas, they too,
contributed to some peasant migrations. In the countryside, displaced Azerbaijani
peasants particularly resented the arrival of Russian peasants who settled around Baku. 48
Similarly, Armenian peasants settled in Nagorno-Karabakh and eventually eclipsed the
local Azerbaijani peasants. Thus, the Azerbaijanis found themselves a minority in their
own capital city and in a principal region of the country. 49
More importantly, economic deprivation tends to exaggerate ethnic turmoil. 50
Thus, recent economic hardships from reduced oil production and other market
discrepancies have intensified traditional ethnic rivalries as each group vies for scarce
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resources. For example, a chief complaint of the Armenian leadership in Nagorno-
Karabakh has been inadequate central Azerbaijani government investment in the regional
infrastructure Another contentious example is average monthly wages Inexplicably,
while agricultural wages did not maintain pace with the national average, industrial and
state employees well exceeded the national average. The economic consequences of
Russian and Armenian command of these positions was not lost on the Azerbaijani
Internal ethnic conflict with the Russians, however, does not prevent the Russian state
from being Azerbaijan's significantly largest trading partner (see TABLE 12).
4. Social
There are three social areas that contribute to ethnic friction in Azerbaijan. First,
there is a rivalry between the intelligentsia elites and the common people
(Russian/Armenian versus Azerbaijani). Although there is a resurgence of Azerbaijani
intellectualism and cultural heritage, unsurprisingly, Russians and Armenians continue to
overshadow this area." This cultural and intellectual conflict is, therefore, essentially
between Turkish and European heritages.
Second, the curriculum of public education accentuates Russian influence.
Again, Soviet national policy deemphasized native regional cultures in favor of a general
Soviet one. Soviet culture, however, equalled Russian language and heritage (see TABLE
6)
Finally, there is the manifest religious rivalry within Azerbaijan (see TABLE 3)
Although some scholars and leaders deny the importance of religion in the current conflict
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over Nagorno-Karabakh, most observers note that there is at least some insidious hint of
truth in the allegation.
52
C. ETHNIC GROUP GOALS
There are three categories of goals of ethnic groups in Azerbaijan: separatists,
ethnocratists and neutrals. Each of these distinct goals translates into significantly
different objectives and actions. Although they have diverse national agendas, there is
one common theme: national self-determination 53,
1. Separatists
Armenians, particularly in Nagorno-Karabakh, desire political and economic self-
determination. As a minimum, the leaders demand a return to autonomy status and at the
extreme, annexation to Armenia. Multiple solutions to the political status of Nagorno-
Karabakh have been offered by both internal and external Armenian activists groups. For
example, the Karabakh Regional Committee, a group of Russian intelligentsia, proposed
six different options that covered the entire spectrum of choices. 54 Externally, three
transnational Armenian nationalist movements, continuing the legacy of the nineteenth
century Armenian Revolutionary Movement, issued a joint communique outlining their
plan for Nagorno-Karabakh. While the communique was similar to the Karabakh
Regional Committee's statement with wide ranging options, this joint communique was
unusual for one reason: the three Armenian groups are traditional rivals with extremely
different political goals.
5
" Once again, the consistent theme was self-determination for
Nagorno-Karabakh in opposition to both the former USSR and Azerbaijani policies.
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2. Ethnocratists
Presently, Azerbaijani nationalists want to consolidate their power and dominate
the state political structure. Having labored under the yoke of Tsarist Russian and then
Soviet rule, the majority nation is prepared to take power. This is a typical response
following colonialism. 50 Interestingly, one of the stated objectives of the Azerbaijan
Popular Front is recognition of Azerbaijani as the official state language. 57 Again, this
group of native intelligentsia prefers that the indigenous majority nation make decisions,
good or bad, rather than a corporatist minority. The ethnic minority Russians, on the
other hand, want to maintain at least equality in the open and dominance in the shadows
3. Neutrals
There is no evidence of activism by any of the small Dagestani and Iranian
minority nations Obviously, while they do not desire persecution or discrimination, they
will settle for a status quo existence. Considering their small numbers and the degree of
continuing assimilation into the majority nation, this is understandable and reasonable.
D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Government response to ethnic competition and strife has been hardest on the
Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, Sumgait, and Baku. As a result of the anti-
Armenian pogroms initiated by militant Azerbaijanis in February 1988, the Supreme
Soviet ordered the Red Army to Azerbaijan. Then in January 1989, possibly as an
attempt to suspend discussions on the status of the region, Nagorno-Karabakh was placed
under direct rule of the Supreme Soviet. Although eventually civilian rule was returned
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to the region, the Armenians were shocked at the Soviet actions. Abandoned by their
traditional ally, they had no choice but to turn to the Armenian Republic for support
Since, the Armenian Republic had already formally requested annexation of the territory
in June 1988, the political state was extremely sympathetic to the plight of the Armenians
in Azerbaijan. After the central Azerbaijan suspended autonomous status for Nagorno-
Karabakh in November 1991, the region declared itself a republic. In solidarity, the
Armenian Republic demonstrated support by invading Azerbaijan More than anything,
the escalation of violence and praetorian responses to the conflict show the substantial
inability of Azerbaijani political institutions to effectively resolve social mobilization
problems. 58
E. CONCLUSIONS
The answer to ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan clearly rests with Russia. The primary
concern for Russia is to secure its southern borders and stop armed violence that threatens
regional peace. Because Armenia is economically stronger than Azerbaijan, it has the
potential to physically annex Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this would only exacerbate
the conflict with Azerbaijan. Therefore, the Russians will exert pressure on the Armenian
Republic to ameliorate its territorial claims and allow Russia to negotiate a political
settlement between the rival ethnic groups in Azerbaijan.
First, Russia will manipulate a replacement of the Azerbaijan government and
substitute it with one with closer ties to Moscow. Second, it will pressure the new regime
to allow a territorial referendum to determine the ultimate political status of Nagorno-
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Karabakh. As long as this region remains under the political control of Azerbaijan, ethnic
strife will continue. Therefore, the answer is to replicate the Nakhichevan solution and
cede the territory to Armenia under Russian auspices. Thus, the Russians will ultimately
support its historical allies, the Armenians.
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IV. CASE STUDY: LEBANON
Beirut. Modern and grim scenes of contemporary social changes in Lebanon
contrast sharply with the bucolic ones from the 1960's. Beirut, the Pearl of the
Mediterranean, was an Arab banking and cultural center. While most Arab countries were
experiencing upheaval, multiethnic Lebanon appeared stable and secure with its
confessional system truss. Many foreign observers believed, therefore, that Lebanon was
a paradigm of multiethnic accommodation and stability.
The 1943 National Pact articulated in a semi-formalized structure the existing realities
of the confessional system. As an important entente and rapprochement between
competing Christian and Muslim ethnic groups, the National Pact provided temporary
stability and insured representation of all confessional groups. It reinforced in a binding
agreement the traditional zu'ama and provided peace.
The National Pact, however, was an ethnic conflict Trojan Horse that would erupt
thirty years later into a civil war that continues even today. Integral to the intensely
violent nature of the 1975 Civil War was the breakdown of central control of the
Lebanese Armed Forces. Organized along confessional lines, the Armed Forces reflected
the ethnic divisions of the National Pact. Once Lebanon divided into confessional groups,
the Armed Forces quickly followed. Thus, the 1975 Lebanese Civil War, the breakdown
30
of the Armed Forces, and consequent violent ethnic conflict is a direct result of the
inflexibility and traditional nature of the 1943 National Pact.
A. ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION
Four major and distinct groups of people inhabit the modern political state of
Lebanon: Christian Lebanese Arabs, Muslim Lebanese Arabs, Armenians, and Palestinian
Arabs (see TABLE 15). The two native Lebanese groups have fluctuated in relative
strength since the official census of 1932 while the Palestinian Arab refugees have
steadily increased.
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In 1932, the Christian Lebanese Arabs were approximately equal to
the Muslim Lebanese Arab population. When combined with the Christian Armenians,
the combined strength was slightly larger. By 1983, however, the Muslims had slightly
surpassed the Christian population (see TABLE 16-18). In consideration of the large
Muslim Palestinian refugee population, the differential is significant (see TABLE 19)
An analysis of the ethnic determinants of these groups further accents some important
societal cleavages and differentials.
1. Major Determinants
a. Language
Although it is not the primary ethnic determinant within Lebanon, the
general importance of language to ethnic identification cannot be overstated.
60 93% of
the Lebanese population speaks Arabic and it is the primary national language.
01 The
other native national language, Armenian, is restricted to that ethnic group In addition,
French is widely spoken by the Maronite intelligentsia
6
- underscoring their traditional and
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close relationship with the former Mandate protectors. 1" Further, the Maronites use
Aramaic during religious services and this usage reinforces their sense of distinctiveness
Other non-Arab ethnic minority groups also maintain their native languages Thus, the
first cleavage in Lebanese society is between Arabs and non-Arabs based on language.
b. Religion
The single most important and the primary determinant of ethnicity in
Lebanon is religion Religious differences permeate all aspects of Lebanese society
dividing the entire state along religious group affiliations. Moreover, these differences
are the essential basis of the confessional system reinforced in the 1943 National Pact.
Although, many scholars only divide Lebanese society into the Christian and Muslim
factions, both religious categories are further subdivided into several nations. 04 This
differentiation is important since it highlights the extremely complex nature of Lebanese
society. It also points out the fractional ization potential that serves as an organizing
factor for secular political mobilization.
Within the Christian Community, there are three primary groups divided by rites:
Maronite, Orthodox, and Catholic. The Maronite rites further strengthen that ethnic
group's identity while the other two rites divide common nationalities. Similarly, the
Muslim community is divided into three sects: Sunni, Shi'ia, and Druze. While the Sunni
and Shi'ia sects are found throughout the Arab world, the Druze are indigenous to the
Levant. An offshoot of Isma'ilyya, the Druze are considered heretical within the Muslim
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community, reinforcing their collective identity The Palestinian refugees, on the other
hand, are predominantly Sunni.
2. Minor Determinants
The minor determinants of geography, culture, history, and economy contribute
to the division of Lebanese society. First, Lebanon is divided into two mountainous
regions, a coastal plain, and an interior valley. Each of these areas has an associated
ethnic group. Maronites along with the Orthodox and Catholic communities dominate the
central coastal plain, East Beirut, and the Western slopes of Mount Lebanon This central
location grants the Christians greater access to seat of power in Beirut. This geographical
distribution was extremely important during the French occupation and reinforced the
special status of the Christian community.
The Muslim community, on the other hand is spread around the periphery of
Lebanon. While the Sunni sect is concentrated in the north around Tripoli, there is a
significant presence in West Beirut. The Shi'ia dominate the Biqa valley, South Beirut,
and the southern Lebanese plain along the Litani River. The Druze are divided between
the southern mountainous western slopes of both the Mount Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon
Ranges. Like the Shi'ia, the Palestinian refugees have spread from the Biqa valley to the
Mediterranean Coast and the Litani River area.
Kinship and the extended family are the basic unit of Lebanese society.
65
Primary linkage between individuals and society is through the blood line and directly
associated with the traditional zit'ama. Lebanon's economic system also reinforces kinship
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lines since most business is family run. A young entrepeneaur must either receive formal
permission to venture beyond the family business or completely dedicate themselves to
its development.
B. SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
1. Historical Perspective
a. General
Like Azerbaijan, history has not been kind to Lebanon. Conquest and
domination have strongly influenced intergroup relations as competing states fought to
control the fertile fruited valleys of Mount Lebanon. Successive waves of Muslims and
Christian conquerors have dominated Lebanon leaving lasting political, economic, and
social marks on the modern state.
The legacy of the politics of domination66 is resentment over the outside
influence of competing states within Lebanon. Two decades of civil unrest in Lebanon
is punctuated by successive interference or invasions by both Syria and Israel. This
external intrusion into the internal affairs of Lebanon has been characterized by bolstering
sectarian disagreements and tensions. In particular, the radicalized Palestinian problem
of southern Lebanon and Israel's subsequent violent activities there, fractionalized the
previous fragile political alliances between the Christians and Muslims. Therefore, while
the 1943 National Pact established the inflexible preconditions for eventual violent ethnic
conflict, radicalized and mobilized Palestinians coupled with foreign influences provided
the ultimate catalyst. 67
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b. The 1975 Civil War
In April 1975, civil war erupted in Lebanon following a fatal occurrence in
a Beirut suburb Kata'ib militiamen ambushed and massacred 27 Palestinians in a bus and
the incident inflamed ethnic communities throughout all of Lebanon Prior tensions were
already high in Lebanon based on traditional political patronage by the President,
Sulayman Franjieh, who alienated Maronites and Muslims alike Similarly, the military
had ended any possibility of neutrality when it used armed force to stop a Muslim
demonstration following the assassination of the Mayor of Sidon. Although it is very
normal to use the military to stop rioting, this act was widely viewed as a sectarian
conflict between a Christian military and Muslim population. All these incidents
conspired to plunge Lebanon into two decades of civil war and ethnic conflict. 68
2. Political
The 1943 Lebanon National Pact is the twin-headed serpent that has shaped
political life there for five decades. 69 On the one hand, the National Pact protects the
different ethnic groups and insures that they have representation in the government. On
the other hand, it is politics of dominance, patronage, and za'im notables At the root of
domination is the inherent descending scale of political power that the National Pact
contains.
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The traditional style of Lebanese politics, established on strict ethnic sectarian
lines, virtually insured that there would develop a crisis. Traditionally, notables within
a confessional group control all political activity.
71 As the pan-Arabist movement rose
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in the 1960's within the Middle East, pressure on the traditional zu'ama political
distribution system increased since the new movement appealed to mass, popular political
participation. Moreover, as a mass movement, it was a direct threat to the established
hierarchical notables, formalized by the Lebanese National Pact, which controlled political
power. The inflexible proportional representation aspect of the 1943 National Pact could
not accommodate direct participation in political activities, especially by unenfranchised
Palestinians.
Further politicization of the Palestinians and threat to the zu'ama occurred with
the 1969 Cairo Accord. 72 This agreement granted an independent status to the
Palestinians and the PLO, isolating them from the remainder of Lebanese society. Since
the PLO was not considered in the 1943 National Pact, their political independence
challenged the traditional representative notables. Eventually, the PLO cross border raids
into Israel prompted two Israeli invasions that sustained the ongoing Christian-Muslim
Civil War. 73
3. Economic
The wealth of Lebanon was established by Maronite and Druze entrepreneurs
with a longtime resident Palestinians. Leaving the Sunni and Shi'ia out of the economic
development in Lebanon was an obvious but understandable mistake. Like many other
Middle Eastern cities, Beirut, Tripoli, and Tyre became magnets for the rural poor in the
1950's. Bidonvilles of slums encircled the major cities with disaffected youths and urban
poor.
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The Lebanese Sunni and Shi'ia ethnic groups were disproportionately represented
in the economic deprivation of the Bidonvilles. The arrival of Palestinian refugees after
both the 1948 and the 1967 Arab-Israeli wars increased the pressure on the limited slum
services available and employment. This situation became explosive when Jordan
attacked Palestinian guerrillas in 1970 and drove them into Lebanon. This resurgent wave
of refugees, associated with the PLO, was radical and mobilized the slum dwellers. 74
4. Social
Despite economic discrepancies Lebanese society is loosely horizontally
stratified. Potentially, all ethnic groups are represented along the entire spectrum of social
class and no one ethnic group is considered inherently or sublimely above another.
However, the reality is that the legacy of the close relationship between the French left
the Maronites disproportionately represented in the upper levels of society. This contrasts
sharply with the elevated status that the Sunni enjoyed during the Ottoman occupation
The reversal of social status between the Maronites and Sunni was slightly mitigated by
the 1943 National Pact. However, it remains a source of social antagonism.
To further complicate religious tensions, the pan-Arab mass movement, rejecting
the West, was closely linked to Islamic faith and the Palestinians.
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Despite the 1943
National Pact and constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, this emphasis on Islam
represented an indirect threat to the Lebanese Christian community.
76 When combined
with a movement to replace the established order of confessional notables, the tensions
were unbearable and two decades of civil war and unrest followed.
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C. ETHNIC GROUP GOALS
1. Separatist
A minority of fundamental Maronites would like to return to an idealized Mount
Lebanon. 77 The continuing pressure of modern political mobilization of competing
Muslim groups, challenges the traditional values and political system of these
ultraconservative Maronites. Their proposed solution, is a separate traditional Christian
state located in the historical Mount Lebanon geographical area.
2. Integrationist
The Palestinian movement is largely integrationist. Their stated political goal is
to correct the Palestinian diaspora. According to Palestinian leaders, especially the PLO,
The solution is to establish a political Palestinian state convergent with or at least located
in the modern state of Israel. 78 Oddly, this integrationist movement that would remove
the refugees from Lebanon, has only tacit support from the Lebanese government other
than periodically perfunctory solidarity announcements calling for Israeli-Palestinian
settlement.
3. Ethnocratist
Both the mainstream Christian and Muslim sectarian movements are ethnocratic.
The Maronites want to retain their domination of the political system according to the
1943 National Pact. Both the Sunni and Shi'ia ethnic groups want equality in the political
system as a minimum and dominance in the end.
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D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
1. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Militias
There is no internal functional central government in Lebanon today. 7g The
legislature and government elected in 1972 have either been extended or the seats allowed
to go unfilled. Instead, the country is divided into two armed camps along sectarian lines:
The Lebanese Front (Maronite) and The National Movement (Sunni/Shi'ia/Druze) (see
TABLE 20). 8 " Other armed factions also exist but fall within the influence of the two
major antagonists. 81 This bifurcation of Lebanon has created mini-ethnic states with
accompanying militia and external sponsors.
The genesis of the breakdown of central government control of armed violence
is deeply rooted in the Lebanese confessional system. Instead of performing an
integrating function as Samual Huntington often suggests is the role of the military, the
Lebanese Armed Forces has always been organized based on ethnic affiliations (see
TABLE 21). When the Lebanese Army began fighting Palestinian forces in southern
Lebanon in 1969, the ethnic tensions increased dramatically, especially in the Muslim
organized units. 82 After four years of fighting the PLO militias, however, the amateurish
Lebanese Army was exhausted and conceded defeat - it could not control the PLO.
With the Lebanese Army emotionally and militarily defeated by PLO militiamen,
the seeds were sown for further disintegration along ethnic affiliations. When ethnic riots
erupted in early 1975, the demoralized Lebanese Army was called out to quell the armed
clashes between ethnic groups. This final assault on the ethnically charged Lebanese
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Army proved too much for many new recruits and Maronite soldiers began to fight
Muslim ones. 84
Perhaps trying to maintain control over the fractionalized Lebanese Armed
Forces, President Franjieh appointed a military cabinet in May 1975 Unfortunately, this
military cabinet reflected traditional confessional loyalties despite its superficial military
neutrality. After only two days, the military cabinet resigned and sectarian armed
violence began in earnest as entire Lebanese Army units disappeared or affiliated
themselves with ethnic militias. 85
As if as a cruel joke of history, the reorganization and reconstitution of the
Lebanese Army in 1982 again followed ethnic affiliations. Trained and equipped by
France and the United States, the new Lebanese Army may be expected to be a modern
integrated force. This expectation is further bolstered by the implementation of a
universal conscription system. However, as long as the Lebanese Army represents
sectarian divisions, it is doubtful that the soldiers could ever remain neutral in any future
ethnically charged combat situations.
2. Government Strategies
As these mini-ethnic states competed with one another for control of physical
territory in Lebanon, there was a shift from a government strategy of accommodation
(consensus and compromise) to a strategy of containment (repression). Instead of
allowing for and respecting religious, sectarian differences, they became a focal point for
ethnic chauvinism, mostly by the Maronite-dominated government The net effect was
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that the Maronites continued to suppress the Muslim attempts to reorder the internal
balance of power This political power stemmed from the Maromte's ability to control
events and suppress opposition with authority derived from the 1943 National Pact
Again, the National Pact created the preconditions that allowed the 1975 Civil War to
erupt.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The legacy of ethnic conflict in Lebanon is one of competition, dominance,
compromise, and consensus. Druze feudalism gave way to Maronite hegemony
Maronite political dominance required compromises with the Sunni. Today, a new
consensus and a new deal are required to account for the importance of the Shi'ia.
However, any new political system must not repeat the strict and binding inflexibility of
the 1943 National Pact.
There are three components to the solution to two decades of armed ethnic violence
in Lebanon. First, the Palestinian refugee problem must be resolved As long as militant
Palestinians remain in Lebanon, Israel will continue to occupy a southern Lebanon
Security Zone. This occupation exacerbates the tension between the Maronite Christian
dominated government and Sunni Muslims who feel solidarity with the Palestinians The
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the
answer to Lebanon's Palestinian problem 8b Once Palestinians gain some political control
of these areas, there will be no reason for Palestinian refugees to remain in Lebanon
Similarly, the raison d'ete for armed militant Palestinians will be eliminated The removal
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from Lebanon of the Palestinians, especially the radical elements, will reduce the ethnic
tension between the Maromtes and Sunnis
Second, the Lebanese Armed Forces must be integrated. Continued reliance on
confessional based units only portends a repeat of the 1975 Civil War tragedy of
desertions when faced with ethnic tensions. Further, this integration, coupled with
universal conscription could forge a true sense of Lebanese nationalism vice traditional
confessional loyalties among present and future military recruits.
Third, the political structure of Lebanese government must recognize the importance
of the Shi'ia. Lebanon's confessional system requires a consensus. The 1943 Arab
National Pact must be revisited with a new consensus established that reflects current
demographics and ethnic group realities. The Maronite Christian fears that a Muslim
coalition will unfairly treat their interests must be assuaged. Peace is possible in Lebanon
by returning to the traditional conflict resolution methods that the competing Lebanese
ethnic groups originally employed: cooperation, compromise, and consensus. In other
words, the Lebanese must return to a strategy of accommodation.
42
V. CASE STUDY: NICARAGUA
Contras While a great deal has been written about the anti-Sandinista movement
in Nicaragua, very little deals with the ethnic dimensions of the struggle. The bifurcated
struggle on the West and East coast of Nicaragua represented two distinct movements
despite their common designation in news reports. The Western movement was mostly
a political struggle; the Eastern movement was a struggle over ethnic freedom for the
Indians.
A. ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION
1. Major Determinants
There are four major genuses of peoples that inhabit the modern political state
of Nicaragua: Mestizo or Landino, Indian, Creole or Blacks, and White (see TABLE 22). 87
Within the general Indian designation, four nations live within the state of Nicaragua.
The most numerous and widespread are the Miskito comprising approximately fifty
percent of the Indian population. The Rama and Sumo are equally divided at twenty
percent for each nation Lastly, the smallest nation, the Garifona, constitutes only about
ten percent of the total Indian population. An analysis of the ethnic determinants of all




There are three predominate languages in Nicaragua: Spanish, English, and
Miskito. These three languages reinforce the general identities of the ethnic groups and
differentiate them. Interestingly, the Whites share both Spanish and English about equally
depending on the region that they live in.
Spanish is the official state language as well as that of the Mestizo. 88 This
predominate status reflects the Spanish conquest and consequent domination of Nicaragua.
Conversely, the next largest language group is English reflecting British occupation and
subjugation of the Atlantic Coast. Finally, the only native language, Miskito, is the
primary language spoken by three of the Indian nations. However, these nations also
have a bilingual knowledge of English (majority) or Spanish (minority).
b. Religion
Religious differences further reinforce the language cleavages. The Spanish
speaking Mestizo are nearly one hundred percent Roman Catholic representing the largest
religious group in Nicaragua. Approximately half the Whites are also Roman Catholic.
The Protestant Moravian Church is the next largest category and is the primary religion
of the Indians, Creole, and the remaining Whites. Again, the religious divisions in




Skin color, body type, and facial features are the most visible symbols of
ethnic group affiliation. Classification of ethnic groups based on distinctive genetics can
range from biological to legal definitions. Like language and religion, common genetic
features tend to promote affinity within an ethnic group.
The most visible division of Nicaraguan society is skin color. This genetic
characteristic graduates from darkest to lightest beginning with the Blacks, Creole,
Indians, Mestizo, to the Whites. Although there are no racial laws designating ethnic
groups by skin color as in South Africa, somatic differences prevail. The genetic make
up of Nicaragua is not only important to ethnic group identification and but also social
status This distinction is discussed in more detail below.
2. Minor Determinants
The minor determinants of geography, culture, history, and economy contribute
to the division of Nicaraguan society. These minor determinants of ethnicity correlate
amazingly with the major determinants and harden the four categories.
a. Geography
There are three distinct geographic regions in Nicaragua: Pacific Coast,
Central Highlands, and Atlantic Coast. 90 Generally, however, most observers of
Nicaraguan society divide it into either the Pacific (majority population) and Atlantic
Coasts (minority population) or Western and Eastern societies. Since the Central
Highlands are indistinguishably linked to the western part of the country, this study will
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also divide Nicaragua in half The true importance of the Central Highlands is the
dividing effect they produce in Nicaragua.
Unfortunately, the Atlantic Coast has never been effectively integrated into the
majority Pacific Coast society. Until recently, there was not even a road or rail link
between the coasts. Mostly, communication networks between the two coasts were either
by sea or air. 91 This division reinforced and exacerbated the major ethnic determinants
listed above as the two distinct societies developed independently.
Finally, another important aspect of this geographic division is closely associated
urban to rural relationship. The Pacific Coast population is predominantly urban and
centered on the capitol city, Managua. On the Atlantic Coast there are some urban
centers but the population is decidedly rural.
b. History
Not surprisingly, the bifurcated historical development of the Nicaraguan
Pacific and Atlantic Coasts is extremely divergent. 92 While the Pacific Coast aligned
itself with Roman Catholic, Spanish speaking, Spain, the Atlantic Coast costenos linked
themselves with Protestant, English speaking, Britain and the Caribbean. Without a
proper appreciation for this historical alignment and separate development of the opposing
coasts, the ethnic strife seems mysterious and imponderable. 93
c. Economy
The economic factor of ethnicity is relevant mostly on the Atlantic Coast
There, employment and ethnic groups combine and reinforce each other On the one
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hand, the Atlantic Coast Indians engage mainly in traditional resource extractive
occupations such as agriculture and mining. On the other hand, the urban-centered
Creoles are known for their merchant abilities and occupied the middle class positions.
Finally, Whites and Mestizos own most of the larger exportive businesses and dominate
governmental bureaucratic positions. Thus, economic occupations alone do not define the
ethnic groups but merely assist in adding further definition to identities.
B. SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT94
1. Historical Perspective
To understand the roots of ethnic conflict in Nicaragua, we must examine and
understand the historical development and experience of the region As alluded to in the
discussion above, the dual nature of Nicaraguan society is the result of the divergent
history of the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts. Separated by different historical developments
yet unnaturally joined in a political union of a single state, the two regions remained
peaceful when they did not interact. The benign neglect of the Somoza regime
maintained the reality of two regions. When the Sandinistas came to power in 1979,
however, the historical neglect suddenly ended. Thus, the stage was set for the latent
ethnic hostilities between the West and East to emerge. 95
Within this historical context it is important to understand that the Sandinistas were
Marxist Their ideological beliefs and practical application of Marxism formed the basis
of the political, social, and economic sources of ethnic conflict.
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In all three areas, the
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confrontation between the Pacific Coast Sandinista central government and the Atlantic
Coast minority ethnic groups resulted in resentment, hostility, and eventual rebellion
2. Political
Under Somoza, the Atlantic Coast was never integrated into mainstream
Nicaraguan political life. 97 While, conventional wisdom would say this was a source of
conflict, just the opposite was true. In fact, since there was no interference with
commercial activities, the Atlantic Coast residents were content to remain aloof from the
intrigue that surrounded the central government. 98
With the end of the Somoza regime in 1979, the newly installed Sandinista
regime took active measures to end the sleepy independence of the East. 99 To facilitate
their integrative goals 100
,
the Sandinistas outlawed the existing Indian organization
ALPROMISU 101 and established a new political action organization, MISURASATA ,o:
Nearly from MISURASATA's inception, Stedman Fagoth led this Indian-oriented,
Sandinista-inspired umbrella association. To further the Sandinistas' attempts to gain
control of the East, they installed Fagoth on a central government planning committee,
The Council of Government. 103
Initially, the relationship of MISURASATA with the central government
prospered. 104 However, Fagoth eventually became disillusioned with the Sandinistas as
their pervading attempts to control Nicaraguan society unfolded into actions By 1981,
the true intentions of the Sandinistas revealed themselves as the central government
increasingly collectivized the Atlantic Coast agricultural production Eventually tiring of
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the militant resistance by Fagoth and other MISURASATA leaders, the Sandinistas
imprisoned them in February 1981 and outlawed the organization. 10 ' This
disenfranchisement eliminated the last legal political ethnic minority organization of the
ethnic minorities. After Fagoth won his release from prison, open Indian confrontation
with the Sandinistas began. Instead of any further cooperation with the central
government, Fagoth formed an illegal alternative organization, MISURA, 106 to oppose
politically and militarily the Sandinistas' violation of Atlantic Coast Indian autonomy
3. Social
There were three interconnected social factor sources of ethnic conflict in
Nicaragua. First, the Sandinistas threatened the very fabric of the Indian and Creole
society. The central government undertook a deliberate program to assimilate forcibly
the ethnic minorities. This program included changes in education and medical
services.
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Before the Nicaraguan revolution, Moravian Church organizations provided
most of these services. In particular, school curnculums were taught in native languages.
However, the Sandinistas rejected this arrangement, secularized education, and introduced
Spanish speaking Cuban teachers. 108 Moreover, Moravian Church clinics were closed and
mostly not replaced with central government resources. This restriction of access to
medical services not only secularized medical care but also threatened the basic health
care availability for the Atlantic Coast minority ethnic groups.
Second, Mestizo administrators from the Pacific Coast replaced traditional village
Council of Elders. 109 While this was primarily a political action, there was also a social
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component. The respect for the traditional life styles of the Indians and Creoles were
replaced by new, progressive dictums from the central government.
Third, Nicaragua, West and East, has always been a stratified society. 110 In the West,
this stratification was socio-economic. In the East, however, the stratification was vertical
based on ethnicity. 111 Whites and Europeans were at the top of the social order followed
by the Indians (Miskitos being the largest group were ranked highest) and then Blacks.
The Mestizos were considered the lowest ethnic group in this rank order social system.
Thus, when the Sandinistas placed Mestizo administrators in positions of power above all
the other ethnic groups, there was a dynamic contradiction to the existing order. While
the Whites and Europeans grudgingly accepted this change, the Indians and Creoles flatly
rejected the new order.
4. Economic
As discussed in ethnic group identification above, the Atlantic Coast Indians
Creoles were a traditional society. They did not dependent on a cash economy and
preferred the simpler system of trade and small subsistence farming. The Sandinistas
challenged this traditional economic arrangement with forced collectivation of farming and
introduction of wage labor. 1 1: Deprived of their traditional livelihoods, the Indians and
Creoles felt threatened with extinction. 113
C. ETHNIC GROUP GOALS
1. Separatists
Clearly, the Indians and Creoles' goals were a return to the autonomy that they
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had enjoyed under the Somoza regime." 4 The pervasive intrusion by the Sandinistas into
their independent cultures caused these two groups to rebel To regain autonomy by
armed violence, Stedman Fagoth recruited approximately 3,000 Indians to join the
northern Contra group FDN U> operating from bases in Honduras. 116 In the south, Eden
Pastora recruited approximately 1,500 Indians and Creoles and formed another armed
resistance group, ARDE, 117 operating from bases in Costa Rica. Both groups had a single





The Sandinistas and their Atlantic Coast Mestizo supporter were ethnocratists.
Their obvious goal was to consolidate power and dominate the entire spectrum of Eastern
society. Importantly, this politics ofdomination^ 9 had a dual thrust. For the Sandinistas
it was merely an attempt to capture and control the mineral resources of the East For
the Atlantic Coast Mestizos, it was an imposition of a new order that benefited them at
the Indian and Creole expense.
D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Central government responses to the ethnic minority separatist movements progressed
in three phases. In February 1981 the Sandinistas launched Phase One with a campaign
of terror and repression against the Miskito Indians Citing security requirements,
government militia 1 " along with some regular soldiers raided several villages to eliminate
the rebel support bases. The raids by the militia were extremely brutal and prompted
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several international human rights investigations. 121
Following a modified Malaysian Solution, Phase Two began in January 1982 Again
citing internal security reasons, the Sandimsta government evacuated Indian villages along
the Rio Coco before a large, organized, armed resistance movement could develop. 1"
Several crowded relocation camps were established in the Indian region and villagers were
forcibly required to live there and work Sandinista farms. 12 " Anyone who resisted
resettlement was labeled a counter-revolutionary- and imprisoned or killed. This aided the
contra propoganda and further alienated the general Indian population from the Sandinista
government. l2A
While Phase One and Two continued splendidly, the armed resistance movements had
a remarkable effect on the Sandinista government. Quietly in 1985, the Interior Minister,
Tomas Borge, initiated Phase Three. Negotiating with Indian leaders, Borge reached a
tentative settlement of the armed struggle that recognized some errors had been made by
the Sandinistas. This agreement also recognized the inalienable rights of the Indians,
official recognition of their ethnic identity, and limited autonomy Thus, the Atlantic
Coast gained its objectives in 1986 and continues in a limited autonomous status in the
political state of Nicaragua.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The ethnic conflict component of the Nicaraguan counterrevolution is often
overlooked by most observers. The predominate attention and analysis focused on the
sponsorship and role of the United States' support for Contras operating from bases in
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western Honduras (FDN). Although some attention occasionally turned to the ARDE
operating from Costa Rica and FDN elements from eastern Honduras, it was mostly
cursory Like the West-East division of Nicaraguan society, these two interrelated
counterrevolutionary movements were distinct. Without an understanding of the ethnic
dimension of the eastern conflict, this subtle difference is lost in the overwhelming
emphasis on the western conflict. Not only were the political goals different but also
were the ethnic groups.
Indeed, the political aspirations of the two groups reflected the national aspirations
of Nicaragua. Eventually, the Sandinista-dominated government realized these differences
and resolved them with the political reality of contemporary Nicaragua. Today, there is
a tentative equality between the Mestizo groups in the west and autonomy for the Indian-
dominated minority group in the east.
This balance of national aspirations must be maintained or the central government of
Nicaragua risks renewed escalation and widening of the current political conflict The
current rebellious actions of hostage taking and armed violence in the West do not affect
or involve the eastern society. As long as the central government faithfully allows some
degree of autonomy for the Miskito and other Indian nations, the Indians will remain
neutral to the political struggle for control of the central government If, however, radical
Sandinista elements regain control of the government in Managua and reinstate previous
domination policies, the Atlantic Coast will rearm and resist Considering the idealogy
of the Sandinistas and their historical record toward the Eastern Society, new ethnic
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conflict can only be avoided by a democratic balance within the central government that
continues to respect the existing autonomy of the Atlantic Coast.
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VI. DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, AND CRISIS
MANAGEMENT
A. THEORETICAL BASIS
As indicated earlier, any analysis of how governments respond to ethnic conflict must
be divided into at least two levels: the international system and state level There is,
however, several immediate difficulties with using current prevalent crisis management
theories and levels of analysis. 125 First, ethnic groups are non-state actors. Although at
times they are organized, control territory, and display some of the common traits of a
state, ethnic groups are seldom recognized by the international community as having state
status.
126 At the international system level (Waltz's Third Image), crisis management
theory is predominantly rooted in structural neorealism theory that does not accept the
concept of non-state actors. 127 Essentially, this approach states that the international
system will dictate the actions of states vis-a-vis each other. 128 It does not account for
how the international system affects sub-state ethnic groups, particularly transnational
ones that transcend traditional state boundaries.
Second, arguments concerning deterrence and compellence are almost entirely based
on structural neorealism theory
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States deter other states but only against territorial
aggression. These arguments do not consider the interplay of ethnic groups in conflict




Third, although reductionist theory does account for non-state actors, it generally
discusses institutions of government and bureaucratic politics rather than sub-state ethnic
groups.
131 Moreover, transnational ethnic groups further complicate state level analysis
since they are not contained within a single state boundary. Therefore it is difficult to
determine which state actually has the predominant influence on a transnational ethnic
group's behavior.
Setting aside the inherent contradictions in these theories as they relate to ethnic
groups and ethnic conflict, it is possible to conduct analysis using the basic tools of the
theories. This hybrid approach begins with the assumption that ethnic groups can be
treated as if they were a state. Although the political leaders of ethnic groups only have
loose control over their constituency, in general, ethnic groups do behave collectively to
achieve definable political goals. The earlier discussion of ethnic group goals outlined
the territorial nature that these objectives often include. Therefore, it is completely
appropriate to interpret ethnic conflict as state on state action within an international
context. Thus, at the international level, deterrence theory gives us some insight into state
actions relative to ethnic conflict. Thus, a combination of deterrence and political
ethnicity theory provides a more robust framework for conflict analysis that transcends
from the state to the international level.
B. DETERRENCE
1. Extended-General Deterrence
Huth describes extended-general deterrence as a condition where a defender
56
prepares for an armed attack against a protege, even when there is no immediate threat. 13
During the Cold War, there was a global extended-general deterrence to ethnic conflict
This does not suggest that there were no instances of this type of conflict since there were
several obvious ones in Lebanon and other states. However, compared to the explosion
of ethnic conflict in the Post Cold War period, there were relatively few. The basis of
this deterrence was the struggle between the United States and The Former Soviet Union
to control world events. Thus, regional disputes, including ethnically based ones, were
ideological battle grounds between the two super powers. Especially the Former Soviet
Union actively suppressed nationalism both within its own borders and within its regional
allies. With the end of The Cold War, suppression of their simmering nationalism
abruptly stopped.
There are two factors that account for this exponential growth in national
consciousness and the suspension of extended-general deterrence. First, the demise of the
former Soviet Union signaled the end of an era of purposeful suppression of selected
national identities. 13j The Soviets consciously and conspicuously manipulated ethnic
groups to achieve their political objectives not only within the USSR but also within their
sphere of influence. Other Communist-inspired governments also recognized the inherent
theoretical conflict between Marxism and nationalism. Thus, while many ethnic groups
were beginning to develop a sense of national identity at the beginning of the twentieth
century, others groups were suppressed.
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Second, the new normative strategy of "Democratic Enlargement" that currently
shapes the foreign policy of The United States encourages national movements Formerly
suppressed nationalities interpret the often quoted United States' ideals of democracy and
self-determination quite literally as promotion of their political objectives to shaped Neu
World Order. Encouraged by these ideological ideals and the history of the United States
defending similar movements during The Cold War, many nations seek self-
determination. 13
"4 However, as with any normative ideal, "Democratic Enlargement"
suffers from a lack of consensus and common definition on the exact meaning of
Democracy.
2. Extended-Immediate Deterrence
During the Cold War, there were several examples of extended-immediate
deterrence in ethnic conflicts. The three case studies discussed earlier are summarized
below.
Extended-Immediate Deterrence
Country Defender Protege Attacker













In each of these three examples, an ethnic group (or representative such as the PLO)
under attack, was defended by either the threat of the use of force or actual introduction
of combat forces The defenders' objectives were to restore peace in favor of the besieged
ethnic group.
3. Strategies of Accommodation
At the state level of analysis, strategies of accommodation are very similar to
deterrence yet subtly different. The central government attempts to deter armed violence
by an ethnic group through conciliation and negotiated settlements instead of the threat
of violence. However, since the ethnic group is nearly always the weaker party, there is
still an implied threat. Nonetheless, this strategy is particularly effective at diffusing
violent ethnic conflict since it concedes to the political (and often socio-economic) goals
of the rebelling ethnic groups. Thus, the state under siege by an ethnic uprising defends
itself through artful negotiations.
C. COMPELLENCE
1. General
The obverse of deterrence is compellence. Once general or even immediate
deterrence fails, the international system takes measures to compel conflict resolution in
ethnic conflict. Although the methods may not always be appropriate, some action is
initiated. The best contemporary example is the Balkan conflict. Any number of
international collective organizations are attempting to resolve the ethnic conflict in
Bosnia through the threat of and actual use of force.
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2. Strategies of Containment
Strategies of containment are state level actions designed to enforce behavior
modification. Ethnic groups are coerced into acceptable actions through punishment.
This is brutal power in a raw form. However, as stated earlier, the survival instinct is
extremely powerful and the net effect of excessive suppression is a prolongation of ethnic
conflict rather than early termination.
D. CRISIS MANAGEMENT
1. General
Ethnic conflict is obviously not always violent. Within a multi-ethnic society,
political, social, and economic competition along ethnic lines can proceed peacefully.
However, a catalytic event can quickly transform peacetime competition into armed
violence. During the Cold War, the eruption of ethnic-based armed violence signaled the
failure of extended-general deterrence and the beginning of a crisis.
2. Crisis Bargaining Codes
J. Philip Rogers discussion of crisis bargaining codes is extremely appropriate
for ethnic conflict. 13 " The entire point of his argument is that, in a crisis, leaders have
different operational codes that drive their behavior. The same is true between ethnic
groups because of the cultural basis of their operational codes. As each group attempts
to deter or compel, negotiate or coerce, ethnic biases shape the parameters of their





Ethnic conflict is social revolution but in a much more dangerous and virulent form
Ethnic groups engaged in revolution invoke many government responses at both the state
and international level While accommodation seems to have utility (as seen in
Nicaragua), containment generally exacerbates the conflict. At the international level,
extended deterrence tends to prolong a conflict especially when combined with a
government program of containment as we have seen in Azerbaijan and Lebanon.
Clearly, the policy prescription for the United States in the Post Cold War period is
to let regional conflicts take care of themselves. General deterrence failed in the
peripheral areas during the Cold war and is meaningless in the contemporary setting.
Immediate deterrence accelerated conflict and increased or prolonged the level of
violence. Neither outcome is desirable.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Ethnic groups are not necessarily political While an ethnic group may have a sense
of a unique identity, it does not necessarily follow that there will be an associated violent
ethnic movement. Indeed, there may be no movement at all except assimilation into a
dominant ethnic group culture. Threatening government actions, however, tend to evoke
a negative reaction. The effort of governments to suppress forcibly ethnic unrest assists
ethnic and communal leaders in their attempts to transform subliminal ethnic identity into
an operational one. This political aspect of ethnicity is the basis of the political ethnicity
paradigm.
Political ethnicity theory is a hybrid of both conflict analysis and descriptive theories.
This synthetic blend provides a comprehensive picture and illustrates the vast range of
dynamic variables that ethnic conflicts revolve around. In summary, political ethnicity
theory explains ethnic conflict using a combination of the other theories with ethnicity as
a skeletal basis. The four components of political ethnicity theory (ethnic group
identification, sources of ethnic conflict, ethnic group goals, and government responses
)is a systematic approach to this contemporary issue. Each of the three case studies
illustrates the practical application of political ethnicity theory to contemporary ethnic
conflicts and leads to four primary conclusions.
First, the presence of transnational ethnic groups faced with repressive government
actions increases the level of ethnic conflict. In each of the case studies, the most violent
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ethnic minority was one that was also transnational This is not surprising since these
groups have an outside source of support to reinforce their actions against a harsh and
repressive regime.
Second, horizontally stratified societies exacerbate inherent societal inequities This
tension increases violence when coupled with other sources of ethnic conflict but is not
a primary cause of ethnic-based turmoil.
Third, government strategies towards ethnic groups do make a difference. As the
case studies effectively illustrate, violent ethnic conflict is mostly associated with
strategies of containment. As governments attempt to repress ethnic group demands for
political, social, and economic power, ethnic identity is reified. Ethnic group and
communal leaders are then able to translate this primordial ethnic identity into an effective
operational ethnic identity in opposition to the government. While it is certainly true that
strong central governments can effectively restrain ethnic conflict with overwhelming
application of force, this strategy of containment is a short term solution that eventually
leads to increased violence.
Strategies of accommodation, on the other hand, allow for political, social, and
economic freedom of minority ethnic groups. These expressions tend to be peaceful and
less threatening to a central government as political, social, and economic power is shared
between competing ethnic groups. Thus, the basis of ethnic conflict is transmuted and
diffused, eliminating the support base of ethnic and communal leaders. The overall result
is that with the loss of their ethnic constituency and raison d'ete for ethnic-based strife,
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the inherent tensions of society are reduced to a manageable level of conflict. Therefore,
strategies of accommodation are long term solutions to ethnic conflict since they
significantly reduce the level of violence.
Although there are numerous other examples of terminated or ongoing ethnic
conflicts, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, and Nicaragua are excellent illustrative case studies that
support the three conclusions above. These three examples show a blend of ethnic




















Azerbaijan Language Yes C - A - C Mixed
Vertical
No
Lebanon Religion Yes A - C Mixed
Vertical
No
Nicaragua Genetics No A - C - A Horizontal Yes
Fourth, with the end of the Cold War, violent conflicts in general have become
increasingly more regional in nature. Despite the horrible atrocities associated with ethnic
conflicts, they do not always require intervention from states outside the affected region.
Indeed, foreign involvement tends to increase the level of violence rather than mitigate
or terminate it. As with any civil war, ethnic conflicts end when one of three events
occurs: one belligerent party wins, all belligerent parties become too exhausted to
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continue, or there is a negotiated settlement equally unfavorable for all Unfortunately,
external interference prolongs ethnic conflict and prevents one of these three conditions
from being met. To put it simply, ethnic conflicts eventually "burn themselves out" if
competing groups are left alone.
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APPENDIX A. AZERBAIJAN TABLES'"









































































TABLE 2. LANGUAGE AFFILIATIONS (1979) 141
Ethnic
Group
Percentage of persons who
consider the language of
























Others 63.7 35.0 26.6
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TABLE 3. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS
Eastern Shi'ite Sunni Armeno-
Orthodox Gregorian
Russian Azerbaijani Azerbaijani Jews






TABLE 4. ORIGINAL WRITTEN SCRIPT





TABLE 5. ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF BAKU 143
Ethnic 1897 % of 1903 % of 1913 % of
Group Pop. Pop. Pop.
Azer-
baijani
Turks 40,148 35.9 44,257 28.4 45,962 21.4
Iran-
•; ^«i44lan 9,426 8.4 11,132 7.1 25,096 11.7
Russian 37,399 33.4 56,955 36.5 76,288 35.5
Armen-
ian 19,060 17.0 26,151 16.8 41,680 19.4




145 111,904 155,876 214,672
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TABLE 6. PUBLIC EDUCATION (SECONDARY SCHOOL) 146














TABLE 7. AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES (IN RUBLES) 147
Year National Industry Agri- State State
Economy culture Insurance Govern-
ment
I960 77 84 58 67 79
1965 90 95 61 79 97
1970 110 120 78 96 109
1975 125 140 100 104 113
1980 140 161 121 110 125
1985 163 182 159 144 147
1990 195 219 164 271 259
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TABLE 8. ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE IN MONTHLY WAGES
Year National Industry Agri- State State
Economy culture Insurance Govern-
ment
I960
1965 17 13 5 18 23
1970 22 26 28 22 12
1975 14 17 28 8 4
1980 12 15 21 6 11
1985 16 13 31 31 18
1990 20 20 3 88 76
1960-
1990 153 161 183 304 227
TABLE 9. COMPARISON OF GNP (IN DOLLARS) (1990) 148












*(In Millions of US Dollars)
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TABLE 10. CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION (IN THOUSAND METRIC TONS) 149
Year Off /o On /o Total /oL_ Shore Change Shore Change Change
1980 9,600 5,053 14,653
1981 9,371 (2.4) 4,703 (6.9) 14,074 (4.0)
1982 8,247 (11.0) 4,666 (.8) 12,913 (8.3)
1983 8,409 2.0 4,286 (8.2) 12,695 (1.7)
1984 8,447 .6 4,057 (5.6) 12,504 (1.5)
1985 9,233 9.3 3,909 (3.7) 13,142 5.1
1986 9,419 2.0 3,902 (.2) 13,321 1.4
1987 10,069 6.9 3,734 (4.3) 13,803 3.6
1988 10,324 2.5 3,417 (8.5) 13,741 (.5)
1989 10,136 (1.8) 3,023 (11.5) 13,159 (4.2)
1990 9,931 (2.0) 2,582 (14.6) 12,513 (4.0)
1991 9,492 (4.4) 2,249 (12.9) 11,741 (6.2)
1980-
1991 (1.1) (55.5) (19.9)
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1986 22,022.1 4.3 21,715.9 7.8
1987 22,101.4 4.4 21,081.5 (2.9)
1988 21,699.6 (1.9) 20,799.1 (1.4)
1989 18,395.3 (15.2) 17,539.3 (15.7)
1990 16,331.6 (11.2) 15,617.6 (11.0)
1991 15,827.0 (4.1) 15,192.9 (2.7)
1985-1991 (25.1) (25.0)
TABLE 12. INTERREPUBLIC TRADE (IN MILLIONS OF RUBLES) (1991) 151
Republics Export % Import %
Slavic 8,912.4 77.8 7,704.6 87.2
Baltic 241.3 2.1 123.6 1.4
Central
Asian 1,467.6 12.8 773.2 8.7
Southern 833.9 7.3 235.2 2.7
Total 11,455.2 8,836.6
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TABLE 13. ETHNIC GROUP COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN
BAKU OIL DISTRICTS (1913) l5:
Occupa- Russian Armenian Azerbai- "Persian" Total
tion jani
Owners
Nonoil 125 255 510 254 1,275
Oil 3 6 347 25 397
Managers
Nonoil 126 61 41 10 324
Oil
Extrac-
tion 585 666 305 54 2,083
Oil
Refining 73 36 1 1 149
Trade
and
Credit 74 104 100 88 450
Workers
Nonoil 2 ,542 l ,697 472 1 r 484 7,015
Oil
Extrac-
tion 5 ,415 6 ,082 4,340 11 r 508 34,479
Oil




stration 74 68 34 46 258
Security 605 59 34 3 882
Judici-
ary 3 3
Medical 155 98 1 358
Note: Total includes undifferentiated ethnic groups.
73
TABLE 14. PERCENTAGE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS
IN BAKU OIL DISTRICTS (1913)
Occupation Russian Armenian Azerbaijani "Persian"
Owners 7.7 15.6 51.3 16.7
Nonoil 9.8 20.0 40.0 19.9
Oil .1 1.5 87.4 6.3
Managers 24.9 28.8 14.9 5.1
Nonoil 38.9 18.8 12.7 3.1
Oil
Extraction 28.1 32.0 14.6 2.6
Oil
Refining 49.0 24.2 .7 .7
Trade
and Credit 16.4 23.1 22.2 19.6
Workers 20.1 18.6 11.2 30.8
Nonoil 36.2 24.2 6.7 21.2
Oil
Extraction 15.7 17.6 12.6 33.4
Oil
Refining 61.1 13.9 2.0 15.1
Profes-
sional 55.8 14.4 4.5 3.2
Admin-
istration 28.7 26.4 13.2 17.8
Security 68.6 6.7 3.9 .3
Judiciary 100
Medical 43.3 27.3 .3
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APPENDIX B. LEBANON TABLES
TABLE 15. MAJOR ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION
















Armenian Biqa Valley ~1





Greek Catholic Arabic Central & East 3
Protestant Arabic Beirut "1
Others Mixed Scattered "1
Muslim









Druze Arabic Shuf Mountains 7
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TABLE 16. POPULATION DATA BY RELIGIOUS GROUP 153
Group 1932 1946 1951 1958 1974 1983
Christian
Maro-


















lics 45,999 66,542 81,764 91,000 191,889
Protest
ants 22,308
157 10,783 12,641 14,000 50,000
Muslim
Sunni 175,925 244,307 271,734 286,000 750,000
Shi ia 154,208 217,520 237,107 250,000 1100000
Druze 53,047 77,023 82,268 88,000 250,000
Total 785,543 1165208 1303951 1550500 3100000 3575000
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TABLE 17. POPULATION DATA BY RELIGIOUS GROUP (%)
Group 1932 1946 1951 1958 1973 1983
Christian
Maro-








olics 1 1 1 1
Greek
Ortho-
dox 10 10 10 10 1-
Greek
Cath-
olics 6 6 6 6 6
Protest
ants 1 1 1 1
Other 3 i6i 1 3 8 3
Muslim
Sunni 22 21 21 19 21
Shi'ia 19 19 18 16 31
Druze 7 7 6 6 7
77
TABLE 18. COMPARISION OF CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM GROUPS (%)
Group 1932 1946 1951 1958 1983
Christ-
ian 52 53 55 59 41
Muslim 48 47 45 41 59
TABLE 19. REGISTERED PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 16:
1973 1982 1985 1987 1990
187,529 238,647 263,599 276,231 302,049
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TABLE 20. 1975 CIVIL WAR MAJOR GROUPS 163





































(Iraq) Abd al Majid al
Rafi'i













2d Brigade Sunni Tripoli,
Dispersed
3d Brigade Sunni Disbanded
4th Brigade Druze Disintegrated
in 1984
Mountain War
5th Brigade Maronite 2,000 Loyal to
President




7th Brigade 1,700 Loyal to
President









10th Brigade Christian 1,800
11th Brigade Druze 900
12th Brigade Shia 1,300 South Lebanon
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1. The vogue term global village is more commonly used to
describe the inter-connectivity of the modern world. I have
replaced this with global city because it more accurately depicts
the complex nature of a mutually dependent world. While a
"village" is generally homogeneous, a "city" is distinctly
heterogeneous. Within the confines of a multi-national city
there are usually ethnic ghettos. These ethnic communities
maintain distinct identities separate from the city's overall
characteristic
.
2. See Ken Jowitt, The New World Disorder: The Leninist
Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
3. An excellent discussion of the transnational aspects of
hyper-nationalism and regional security implications is found in
Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace" in The Cold War and After,
edited by Jean M. Lynn-Jones (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1992), 236-240.
4. Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1982), 1.
5. There are two factors that account for this exponential
growth in national consciousness. First, the demise of the
former Soviet Union signalled the end of an era of purposeful
suppression of selected national identities. The Soviets
consciously and conspicuously manipulated ethnic groups to
achieve their political objectives not only within the USSR but
also within their sphere of influence. Other Communist-inspired
governments also recognized the inherent theoretical conflict
between Marxism and nationalism. Thus, while many ethnic groups
were beginning to develop a sense of national identity at the
beginning of the twentieth century, others groups were
suppressed. Second, mass media and information penetration
promotes national consciousness. Contact with other people
highlights differences. This has allowed scattered people to
recognize that they share commonality with some groups and
differences with others. National consciousness is fostered by
inter-group relations and activities, not isolation. Third,
nationalism is an artificial construction for political purposes.
Political leaders invoke nationalism to mobilize a constituency.
Walker Connor and Louis Snyder's cited works provide an excellent
and informative in depth analysis of this phenomena. Also see
Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), Carlton J. H. Hayes,
The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: Russell
and Russell, 1968), Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), Harold R.
Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change
(New York: Harper and Row, 1975), T. V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism
in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological
Perspectives (Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun and Company, 1983),
and Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Cambridge,
MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993).
6. For a complete discussion of levels of analysis see Kenneth
N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
7. A notable exception to this general rule is the Palestinian
Liberation Organization that received official recognition and
state status with the United Nations. This recognition has now
been bolstered by the negotiations for the PLO to control the
Gaza strip and the West Bank in Israel.
8
.
A comprehensive discussion of each of the determinants and
their role in ethnic group identity is found in Ethnic Autonomy-
Comparative Dynamics, edited by Raymond Hall (New York: Pergamon
Press, 1979). This valuable work has many contributors that
examine separately the relationship between micro-variables and
political goals of ethnic groups. The idea of distinguishing
between major and minor determinants, however, is my own
creation. One variable that I did not incorporate into my
discussion of ethnic group identity is patterns of domination.
However, I discuss this idea under the heading "Sources of
Ethnic Conflict" in a much broader context.
9. The importance of language as a discrimanent in ethnic group
identification is confirmed in several sources found in the
bibliography. The specific references are too numerous to list
but the most cogent statement of the role of language in
nationalism (ethnic group identification) is from Max Boehm in
his 1933 contribution to the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences:
The concept of a mother tongue has made language the
source from which springs all intellectual and
spiritual existence. The mother tongue represents the
most suitable expression of spiritual individuality
... A people not only transmits the store of all its
memories through the vocabulary of its language, but
in syntax, word rhythm it finds the most faithful
expression of its temperament and general emotional
life. The rare cases wherein a people retained its
individuality despite the loss of its language do not
disprove the conviction of a people or national group
that they are defending in language the very
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cornerstone of their national existence. The
encouragement of dialect is somewhat analogous to the
regionalist cult of the local homeland (235).
10. An interesting discussion of the relationship between
language and thought processes is found in John W. Berry et al
Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992)
11. I prefer the word genetics to the more common race. The use
of race to describe an ethnic group too often takes on a
pejorative attribute that should be avoided. Having said that,
however, genetic traits are the fundamental basis for racism.
12. Ethnic Autonomy-Comparative Dynamics, edited by Raymond L.
Hall (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), xxvi.
13. This statement directly contradicts the view of Orlando
Patterson in his book Ethnic Chauvinism (New York: Stein and Day,
1977), 105. Although I agree that classes are economic groups,
they can become default ethnic groups. This occurs when class
members primary basis of comparison with other members of society
is economic or social status (Karl Marx would certainly have
agreed with this logic). Donald Horowitz explains it differently
in his book Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985), 21-36. He draws a distinction between
societies with ranked and unranked ethnic groups:
. . . stratification in ranked systems is synonymous
with ethnic membership. Mobility opportunities are
restricted by group identification (22).
14. Political authorities often decide the distribution of
scarce resources in a stratified society. Although they approach
political authority from different perspectives, Leites and Wolf,
Popkin, and Scott all discuss how a breakdown in the distribution
process leads to social revolution.
15. For detailed case studies of preferential public policies
see Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States,
edited by Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy (Boulder: Lynee
Rienner Publishers, 1986).
16. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985), 186.
17. Cynthia H. Enloe in Ethnic Conflict and Political
Development (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973) states:
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There are several reasons why ethnic groups per se
rarely become the bases of revolution. First,
ethnicity is not primarily ideological or political;
rather, it is cultural and social. Ethnic groups have
enormous potential for political development, but
politics remain secondary to other bonds and values
shared by members. Second, in times of crisis ethnic
communities are harder to expand than are ideological
or functional associations . . . Finally, by being more
exclusive and having boundaries more visible, ethnic
groups have a difficult time winning the confidence
and trust of potential allies. Their objectives seem
too parochial and their leadership too alien to excite
active participation within the majority (222).
Although this is a compelling argument, I contend that the
enormous potential she wrote about twenty years ago is today
being mobilized for essentially parochial objectives.
18. For a discussion of the related concept of relative
depravation, see Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1970).
19. Samual P. Huntington explains how social frustration because
of inadequate institutions leads to political participation and
ultimately political instability in his book Political Order in
Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). I
have taken some liberty to expand his arguments to include ethnic
groups.
20. For a full explanation of the moral disengagement phenomena
see Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of moral disengagement" in
Origins of Terror, edited by Walter Reich (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), 161-191.
21. Donald L. Horowitz has an excellent discussion of the idea
of emulation and fear of extinction in Ethnic Groups in Conflict,
171-181
22. The use of political goals in this context refers to the
political status of a nation-states, their sub-divisions, and
political representation in governments. If we accept that
political authority leads to economic authority, then achievement
of political goals also secures economic objectives.
23. Samuel P. Huntington outlines this distinction in his book
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1976), 78-92.
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24. The anthropological divisions cited are a distillation and
compilation of the following works: Ronald Wixman, The Peoples of
the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1984); Central Intelligence Agency, The World
Fact Book 1992 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1992); Central Intelligence Agency, Map Number 724594 (R000397),
3-94); PC Globe Rel . 5., PC Globe, Inc., Tempe, Arizona.
25. This case study does not use the terms state and nation
interchangeably. State refers to the political organization with
established and recognized (even if in dispute) borders. The
term nation is reserved for a group of people who have a
collective sense of identity. Nations do not necessarily have
established and recognized borders. The members of a nation do,
however, occupy and control territories. Any serious
investigation of ethnic conflict must draw this distinction. For
further amplification of this principle, see the collected works
of Walker Connor cited in the bibliography.
26. Numerous references identify language as the determinant
that defines ethnicity. Certainly it is a crucial element that
provides the cognitive framework that shapes peoples
interpretation of events and their physical environment. An
insightful discussion of this linkage is found in John W. Berry
and others, Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 101-109.
27. Frank Huddle, Jr., "Azerbaidzhan and the Azerbaidzhanis" in
Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities
, ed. Zev Katz, Rosemarie
Rogers, and Fredric Harned (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 197-
198.
28. Wixman, 184 and 194-195.
29. The Soviets had a definite program to adjust and manipulate
the written languages of the various republics. Azerbaijan was
no exception. Wixman cites numerous examples of this policy.
Also cited by Huddle, 197. The best discussion titles the
process linguistic nationalism, Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her
Colonies , reprinted 3rd edition (New York: Archon Books, 1967),
18-19.
30. According to Gerard J, Libardian, ed. The Karabagh File:
Documents and Facts on the Region of Mountainous Karabagh, 1919-
1988, 1st edition (Toronto: The Zoryan Institute, 1988), 133, in






31. The most important historical controversy is the death of
many Armenians in Azerbaijan in 1905 and in Turkey in 1915. The
Armenians refer to the Turkish event as the Genocide of 1915.
Without additional elaboration, both groups place culpability on
the other.
32. While much of this analysis is speculative based on
historical evidence, current events appear to validate the
suppositions. In general, there are very few instances where an
ethnic group actually definitely identifies the root causes of
their racial dislike for another group. Mostly, it is just
perceived reality. Then again, perceptions can be reality.
33. Audrey L. Altstadt states the principle of historical
analysis quite nicely and succinctly as:
Soviet historians seek to clarify the ethnic and
cultural roots of Azerbaijani Turks in the distant
past.
Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijan Turks: Power and Identity
under the Russian Rule (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1992), 1.
34. The importance of history to understanding contemporary
issues is addressed by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May,
Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New
York: The Free Press, 1986).
35. Oil has been exported from the Baku area since at least the
tenth century. Altstadt, 21.
36. A short chronology of conquest shows this pattern of
domination and the seeds of conflict:
Beginning of Recorded History - 7th Century AD
Armenians move into and occupy region.
8th Century - 19th Century
Arabs conquer to the area and trade the principalities
among the warring states.
19th Century
Russia invades and secures territory in 1805.
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1905
Azeri's massacre Armenians in Transcaucus.
1918
Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan declared. Nakhichevan
and Karabagh are given status of autonomous districts under the
protectorate of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis massacre 15,000-20,000
Armenians.
1919
Armenia and Karabagh declare themselves inseparable.
Azerbaijani impose rule by force.
1920
Soviet Red Army occupies Azerbaijan and Armenia. Both
declared Soviet Republics.
1920-1988
General Armenian unrest in Karabagh and Baku.
1988
Azerbaijanis attack Armenians in Karabagh, Baku, and




Azerbaijan revokes autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabagh.
Karabagh Committee retaliates by declaring itself the Nagorno-
Karabagh Republic.
Libardian, 145-154 and CIA, The World Fact Book 1992, 24.
37. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985), 22 and 186-196.
38. See Altstadt, 29-33.
39. See Altstadt, 40.
40. According to Graham Smith, there were four main points to
the Soviet policies towards the republics:
1. The Soviet federation denies the nationalities the
right to national self-determination , with only a
minimal degree of political manoeuvrability being
granted to the local party-state machine in running
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the union republic. . . .
2
.
As a product of central policy, each of the non-
Russian republics has developed a specialized , core-
dependent economy . . . and concomitant specialized
territorial division of labour. . . .
3. The upward mobility of natives within their union
republic homelands has been aided by affirmative
action policies which have contributed to the
nativization of the local political leadership and to
the growth of an indigenous middle class through
preferential access to higher education and to party
membership. . . .
4. Each of the non-Russian republics possesses a
flourishing native culture and language aided by a
variety of institutional supports provided as a
conseguence of their territorial status. Yet local
cultures, while supported by the Soviet federation,
have also been subjected to standardizing linguistic
and cultural pressure from a Russian-dominated state.
Graham Smith, "The Soviet federation: from corporatist to crisis
politics" in Shared Space: Divided Space, edited by Michael
Chisholm and David M. Smith (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 85-86.
41. Audrey L. Altstadt correctly states that the key to
understanding the political climate in Azerbaijan is to
understand the importance of the Russians:
Since the Russian conguest early in the nineteenth
century, the central issue in the political life of
Azerbaijan has been the relationship with the
Russians. Relations with other peoples, though
historically significant and sporadically crucial,
have become secondary, (p. xxiii)
42. Azerbaidzhan has had an especially strong
reputation for pervasive mafia-type networks.
Azerbaidzhani patron-client relationships have
been rooted in geographical and clan ties that
transcend the political rivalries of the Soviet
period. . . . the presence or absence of
Moscow's support has been critical to the
functioning and fate of its regimes.
John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 191-192.
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43. See Altstadt, 20-23 and John Odling-Smee, Economic Review:
Azerbaijan (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, May
1992), 13-18.
44. See Altstadt, 38.
45. Inadequate investment and technological obsolescence
combined with environmental problems are the direct causes of
production decline. See Odling-Smee, 13-18.
46. See Altstadt, 30-32.
47. The sentiment of the Russians and Armenians is summed up
well by Audrey L. Altstadt
Russians and Armenians sometimes expressed their
perception that Baku was their island in an 'alien'
ocean , forgetting that the ocean was the native
population. Azerbaijani Turks in Baku, however, were
conscious of links to the hinterlands from which both
the intellectuals and workers had come (p. 49).
48. See Alstadt, 35.
49. See Libardian, 133 and Rasma Karlins, Ethnic Relations in
the USSR: The Perspective From Below (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986),
230 and 232.
50. See Horowitz, 108-116.
51. See Alstadt, 50-62.
52. Nissman and Alstadt conflict in their views of this issue.
In congressional testimony, Nissman categorically stated that
religion is not an issue. Alstadt discusses the Muslim-Christian
cleavage and conflict throughout her scholarly book. Other
students of Azerbaijan also mention this natural source of
conflict and I agree with their assessment. See Gitelman, 9 and
U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
The Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis: Prospects for Resolution, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., 23 October 1991, 27-31.
53. Although the term self-determination has become a clique
for any national movement, there is not a better one available to
describe the condition in Azerbaijan. See Conflict in the Soviet
Union: Black January in Azerbaidzhan (New York: Human Right
Watch, May 1991), 5-6.
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54. For details of this wide ranging "plan" see Yuri Rost,
Armenian Tragedy (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), 6.
55. Two of the groups, the Ramgavars and Hunchaks, are Pro-
Soviet. The third, the Dashnaks, is vehemently Anti-Soviet. See
Rost, 8-11.
56. For a detailed explanation see Horowitz, 185-228
57. See Conflict in the USSR, 5-6, Gitelman, 3-8.
58. For a complete discussion of the linkage between conflict
and social mobilization, see Huntington, 53-56.
59. It is argumentative to describe any Lebanese ethnic group
as native. Within this case study, native Lebanese are those
that occupied the area prior to the end of the Nineteenth
Century. This roughly distinguishes the relatively new
immigration of Armenians and Palestinians from the original
Christian and Muslim Arab inhabitants.
60. Numerous reference identify language as the determinant
that defines ethnicity. Certainly is as a crucial element that
provides the cognitive framework that shapes peoples
interpretation of events and their physical environment. An
insightful discussion of this linkage is found in John W. Berry,
et al, Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 101-109.
7. See David C. Gordon, The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in
Jeopardy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 51-52.
62. The Muslim intelligentsia also speak French but their
numbers are significantly less than those of the Maronite
Christians.
63. Muslim intelligentsia also have a command of French through
the education system but not to the degree that the Maronites do.
64. This case study does not use the terms state and nation
interchangeably. State refers to the political organization with
established and recognized (even if in dispute) borders. The
term nation is reserved for a group of people who have a
collective sense of identity. Nations do not necessarily have
established and recognized borders. The members of a nation do,
however, occupy and control territories. Any serious
investigation of ethnic conflict must draw this distinction. for
further amplification of this principle, see the collected works
of Walker Connor cited in the bibliography.
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65. Gordon, p. 33.
66. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985), 22 and 186-196.
67. David McDowall, Lebanon: A conflict of minorities , Minority
Rights Group Report Number 61 (London: Minority Rights Group,
1986), 14.
68. McDowall, 14.
69. See Thomas Collelo, ed, Lebanon: A Country Study
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1987), 55-59 and 143-152.
70. See Gordon, 77.
71. See R. Hrair Dekmejian, Patterns of Political Leadership:
Egypt, Israel, Lebanon (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1975), 11-101 and Elie A. Salem, Modernization without
Revolution: Lebanon's Experience (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1973), 52-74.
72. Trevor N. Depuy and Paul Martell, The Arab-Israeli Conflict
and the 1982 War in Lebanon (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1986), 29-
30.
73. See Depuy, 31-36 and McDowall, 14.
74. See Gordon, 91-95 and Itamar Rabinovich, The War for





78. Numerous sources support this political goal of the PLO.
However, historical facts are even more telling. The recent
self-rule movements for the Gaza Strip and Jericho are just the
latest manifestations of these goals.
79. Rabinovich, 96.
80. Rabinovich, 97.
81. See Collelo, 239-243.
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82. Collelo, 186.
83. The result of this defeat was the Melkart Agreement that
allowed the PLO virtual autonomy in Lebanon, including the right
to an independent militia outside of Lebanese government control
See Collelo, 188.
84. Collelo, 189.
85. Collelo, 189 and 222-226.
86. The current negotiations between Israel and the PLO to
resolve just this issue will allow Lebanon to also move forward
in solving its internal problems.
87. The anthropological divisions cited come from a
distillation and compilation of the following works: James D.
Rudolph, ed. , Nicaragua: a country study (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1982), Central Intelligence Agency,
The World Fact Book 1992 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1992), and maps provided by Bernard Nietschmann to U.S.
Congress, House, Task Force on Central America, Republican Study
Committee, Violence and Oppression in Nicaragua (Washington,
D.C.: The American Conservative Union, 1984).
88. Rudolph, xiv.
89. I prefer the word genetics to the more common race. The
use of race to describe an ethnic group too often takes on a
pejorative attribute that should be avoided. Having said that,
however, genetic traits are the fundamental basis for racism.
90. See Rudolph, 63-101.
91. See Rudolph, 92.
92. See Rudolph, 3-27.
93. The importance of history to understanding contemporary
issues is addressed by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May,
Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New
York: The Free Press, 1986).
94. While some of this analysis is speculative based on
historical evidence, counterrevolutionary events appear to have
validated the suppositions. In general, there are very few
instances where an ethnic group actually definitely identifies
the root causes of their racial dislike for another group.
Mostly, it is just perceived reality. Then again, perceptions
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can be reality.
95. See U.S. Department of State, Human Rights in Nicaragua
under the Sandinistas: From Revolution to Repression (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 60.
96. For a detailed description of the Sandinistas' Marxist
idealogy see David Nolan, The Idealogy of the Sandinistas and the
Nicaraguan Revolution (Coral Gables, FL: Institute of
Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1988).
97. See U.S. Department of State, Human Rights. . ., 60.
98. See Rudolph, 91.
99. See U.S. Department of State, Human Rights. . ., 60.
100. The reason for integration is obvious:
The concerted effort to integrate the Atlantic Coast
region into mainstream Nicaraguan life was, in large
part, a recognition that this vast, underpopulated
region could serve - as it had in the past - as a
staging area for counterrevolution. Traditionally
isolated from the heartland of Nicaragua in the
largely mestizo Pacific region, the residents of the
Atlantic Coast, about half of whom are Miskito Indians
who had played virtually no role in the struggle to
overthrow Somoza, were initially wary of the new
government (Rudolph, xxvi )
.
101. ALPROMISU is an acronym for Alliance for the Progress of
Miskitos and Sumos.
102. MISURASATA is an acronym for Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and
Sandinista Unity.
103. See Rudolph, 162-164.
104. See Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family
(New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 298.
105. See U.S. Department of State, Dispossessed: the Miskito
Indians in Sandinista Nicaragua (Washington, D.C: Government
Printing Office, 1986), 3.
106. This new organization was still Indian-based but dropped
the Sandinistas from the name and orientation.
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107. See Christian, 300-301.
108. See Glenn Garvin, Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA &
the Contras (New York: Brassey's, 1992), 17.
109. In some cases the elders were simply killed. See Garvin,
19.
110. A complete discussion of societal stratification is found
in Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985), 22 and 186-196).
111. See Rudolph, 92-93.
112. See Rudolph, 105-130.
113. Horowitz, 171-181.
114. See Congress, House, Republican Study Committee, Violence
and Oppression in Nicaragua: Hearing Before the Task Force on
Central America, 28 June 1984, 73-78; and Rudolph, 168.
115. FDN is an acronym for Nicaraguan Democratic Force.
116. See Rudolph, 174.
117. ARDE is an acronym for Democratic Revolutionary Alliance.
118. Although the term self-determination has become a clique
for any national movement, this is exactly what the Indian and
Creole freedom-fighters hoped to return to.
119. For excellent discussions of the politics of dominance see
Horowitz, and Richard M. Burkey, Ethnic & Rachial Groups: The
Dynamics of Dominance (Menlo Park, CA: Cummings Publishing
Company, 1978).
120. Government militia were lightly armed groups of locals
recruited by the Sandinistas to maintain order as reguired. In
actuality, they were ill-trained and ill-led. For all intents
and purposes they were merely armed gangs that were loosely
accountable to the central government.
121. See Human Rights. . ., 60-64; C.P.D.H. Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua (New York: Puebla
Institute, 1987); Nina H. Shea, "Testimony for Nicaraguan
Refugees," Nicaragua in Focus, Vol. 1, No. 4, Joseph E. Davis,
ed. (New York: Puebla Institute, 1987), 16-23; and Congress,
Senate, Republican Policy Committee, Turmoil in Central America
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(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 45-53.
122. See U.S Department of State, Dispossessed. . ., 3-4;
Congress, Senate, Turmoil. . ., 60-61.
123. See Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "The FSLN in Power,"
Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional Perspective , edited by
Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Duran (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987),
20-21.
124. See Garvin, 68.
125. For a complete discussion of levels of analysis see Kenneth
N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
126. A notable exception to this general rule is the Palestinian
Liberation Organization that received official recognition and
state status within the United Nations. This recognition has now
been bolstered by the negotiations for the PLO to control the
Gaza strip and the West Bank in Israel.
127. For an excellent discussion of neorealism theory that
outlines both the positive and negative aspects, see Robert O.
Keohane, ed. , Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986).
128. Waltz, Man, the State and War, 159-186.
129. See Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of
War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 15-27 and Thomas C.
Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966), 69-91.
130. See Waltz, Man, the State and War, 80-123.
131. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories,"
in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1986).
132. Huth, 17.
133. According to Graham Smith, there were four main points to
the Soviet policies towards the republics:
1. The Soviet federation denies the nationalities the
right to national self-determination , with only a
minimal degree of political manoeuvrability being
granted to the local party-state machine in running
96
the union republic . . . .
2
.
As a product of central policy, each of the non-
Russian republics has developed a specialized , core-
dependent economy . . . and concomitant specialized
territorial division of labour. . . .
3. The upward mobility of natives within their union
republic homelands has been aided by affirmative
action policies which have contributed to the
nativization of the local political leadership and to
the growth of an indigenous middle class through
preferential access to higher education and to party
membership. . . .
4. Each of the non-Russian republics possesses a
flourishing native culture and language aided by a
variety of institutional supports provided as a
conseguence of their territorial status. Yet local
cultures , while supported by the Soviet federation,
have also been subjected to standardizing linguistic
and cultural pressure from a Russian-dominated state.
Graham Smith, "The Soviet federation: from corporatist to crisis
politics" in Shared Space: Divided Space, edited by Michael
Chisholm and David M. Smith (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 85-86.
134. State refers to the political organization with established
and recognized (even if in dispute) borders. The term nation is
reserved for a group of people who have a collective sense of
identity. For further amplification see the collected works of
Walker Conner cited in the bibliography.
135. See J. Philip Rogers, "Crisis Bargaining Codes and Crisis
Management," in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).
136. For a detailed discussion of how misperception shapes
leader behavior, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception
in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976)
.
137. Unfortunately, much of the demographic data for Azerbaijan
is only available in Russian. Therefore, I have relied in some
cases on secondary sources with their built in prejudices.
However, I believe that the historical demographic data is still
valuable and provides insight into the current ethnic strife
within Azerbaijan for two reasons. First, ethnic groups have
long racial memories. Imagined or real injustices of the past
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manifest themselves in contemporary hatreds. Second, there are
too many examples where past socio-economic discrepancies provide
the basis for present conditions to ignore or dismiss their
importance.
138. Sources consulted:
Ronald Wixman, The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook
(Armonk, NY: M.E Sharpe, 1984), 13, 15-18, 125-126, 138-139, 168-
170, 184, 194-195, 231-245.
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book 1992
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 24.
Central Intelligence Agency, Map Number 724594 (R000397), 3-92
PC Globe Rel. 5, PC Globe, Inc., Tempe, Arizona.
139. The Tsakhur are being heavily assimilated into Azerbaijani
culture and most have lost their native language. Many also speak
fluent Avar and Russian. Robert Wixman, 194-195.
140. The Talysh are nearly completely assimilated into the
Azerbaijani culture. Robert Wixman, 184.
141. Source consulted:
Vinod Mehta, Soviet Economy: Development of Azerbaijan
,
(New
Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1982), 16.
142. In 1928, with the notable exceptions of Russian and
Armenian, Latin became the official written script for all
languages. Again with the same exceptions, the official written
script was changed to Cyrillic in 1938.
143. Source consulted:
Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity
under Russian Rule (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992),
32.
144. Iranian totals include a large, undifferentiated number of
Iranian Azerbai janis.
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146. Source Consulted
R. Avakov, Public Education in Soviet Azerbaijan: Appraisal of an
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Delhi: Sterling Publishers: 1982), 84-85.
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148. Source Consulted:
PC Globe Rel. 5, PC Globe, Inc., Tempe, Arizona
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151. Source Consulted:
John Odling-Smee, Economic Review: Azerbaijan (Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund, May 1992), 66.
152. Source consulted:
Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity
under Russian Rule (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992),
37.
153. The last official census in Lebanon was conducted in 1932.
These population figures are estimations from the United Nations
Sources: The Middle East and North Africa, l-38th Editions,
(London: Europa Publications, 1958-1991) and David McDowall,
Lebanon: A conflict of minorities , Minority Rights Group Report
Number 61 (London: Minority Rights Group, 1986).
154. Armenian Orthodox and Catholics population figures were
combined in the 1932 census.
155. Armenian Orthodox and Catholic population figures were
combined in 1983.
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combined in 1983.
157. Others included Jews, Latins, Protestants, and various
eastern Christian groups for the 1932 census.
158. Armenian Orthodox and Catholic percentages were combined in
1932.
15 9. Armenian Orthodox and Catholic percentages are combined for
1983.
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(London: Europa Publications, 1958-1991).
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